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AN EXTRAORDINARY  increase in commodity  prices occurred in  1973-74. 
Even leaving aside crude oil as a special case, primary  commodity  prices 
on one index  more  than  doubled  between  mid-1972  and  mid-1974,  while  the 
prices of some individual  commodities,  such as sugar and urea (nitroge- 
nous fertilizer),  rose more than five times. While the timing differed  from 
commodity  to commodity,  the sharp  upward  movement  was widespread, 
affecting  virtually  all commodities.  Most rose dramatically  to twenty-year 
highs,  and many went to historical  highs. (This is not the innocuous  state- 
ment it would be for manufactures,  whose prices have been subject  to a 
slow upward  creep;  many commodities  had lower  prices  in 1970  than they 
did in 1953.) 
The sharp  rise in commodity  prices  startled  most observers,  for it came 
on the heels of apparent  oversupply  in 1970-71, and it fed recently  aroused 
concerns  about long-term  commodity shortages,  seeming to confirm  the 
gloomy forecasts of the "eco-doomsters."  The Limits to Growth,'  which 
forecast  the ultimate  collapse  of the world  system  with  unrestrained  growth, 
was  published  with  much  fanfare  in 1972,  and together  with  the subsequent 
run-up  of commodity  prices, seemed  to herald the arrival  of a Ricardian 
economy  in which growing  population  and output of manufactured  goods 
would press on a limited  resource  base. 
In addition,  the commodity  boom came at a time of heightened  concern 
about inflation.  The general  price level in the United States accelerated 
1. Donella H. Meadows and others, The Limits to Growth  (Universe Books, 1972). 
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from virtual  stability  before 1966, and consumer  prices continued  to rise 
at the higher  rates  right  through  the recession  of 1970-71.  Thus, the boom 
of 1973-74  in commodity  prices  perhaps  both reflected  and reinforced  in- 
flationary  expectations. 
Then, from  their  peaks in late 1973  or early 1974,  commodity  prices,  oil 
and some foods excepted, fell almost as dramatically  as they had risen, 
though generally  not back to pre-1972  levels. 
Interesting  tales  can be told about  many  of the individual  commodities- 
the special  circumstances  that led to the rise in prices  and to the subsequent 
fall. Bad weather  reduced  harvests  of many crops here and there around 
the world,  labor  disruptions  curtailed  mine output,  several  important  mate- 
rials-producing  countries  were  subject  to political  unrest,  newly  rich  Arabs 
were buying disproportionately  large amounts, and so on. But the move- 
ment in commodity  prices was quite general,  and while these stories are 
intriguing  and sometimes significant,  they do not fill the need for some 
general  explanation-a common  cause, or strong  linkages  among  the com- 
modities  affected. 
The purpose  of this paper  is to analyze  the 1972-75  movements  in com- 
modity prices in the light of historical  experience,  with a view to estab- 
lishing how much can be explained  by conventional  economic analysis  of 
the general  demand  for and supply  of industrial  raw  materials.  (Except  for 
some general  description,  foodstuffs  and petroleum  will be excluded.)  We 
will then discuss  the extent  to which  the remaining,  "unexplained,"  part of 
the price movements can be reasonably attributed  to  "speculative"  or 
inflation-hedging  demands for commodities. The last part of the paper 
briefly  addresses  the social costs of sharp and erratic  movements  in com- 
modity prices and considers  the pros and cons of policies to limit such 
movements,  with special emphasis on the management  of buffer stocks. 
The Commodity  Boom 
Prices for most primary  commodities  began to rise rapidly  in 1972, al- 
though a few took off in 1971;  they hit their peaks in the summer  of 1973 
or, in the case of many  metals,  in the spring  of 1974,  with some of the agri- 
cultural  products  having a second peak, typically  lower than the first, in 
early  1974.  The Economist  dollar  index of twenty-eight  commodities,  heav- 
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1974, 115 percent  above the level of two years earlier,  and then declined 
irregularly  by 21 percent  by June 1975,  when it began  rising  again.2  Prices 
of industrial  materials,  with which we shall be concerned  here, rose 127 
percent  over  two years  to their  peak in April 1974,  then declined  by 40 per- 
cent by June 1975. 
These are extraordinary  changes. During the 115 years that the Econ- 
omist  index for all commodities  (including  foodstuffs,  but excluding  fuels) 
has been compiled,  in no year have commodity  prices  risen as rapidly  (63 
percent)  as they did from 1972 to 1973 and in no three-year  period have 
they risen as rapidly  (159 percent)  as in 1971-74. The closest year-to-year 
change  came in 1949-50  (48 percent)  and the closest three-year  increase  in 
1914-17 (101 percent).  The largest  annual decline  in the index during  the 
Great Depression was only 17 percent, although a drop of 33 percent 
occurred  between 1920 and 1921. Thus, the recent  commodity  boom and 
bust is striking  not merely  against  the relatively  stable background  of the 
preceding  twenty  years,  but even across  a much  longer  perspective,  encom- 
passing  the late-nineteenth-century  heyday  of price  flexibility  (see figure  1). 
A composite index typically involves offsetting  movements among its 
components,  and for a number of commodities  the price movements  in 
1972-75 were reminiscent  of, and no larger  than, those before the Second 
World  War.  But the recent  movement,  like that of the Korean  War  boom, 
was noteworthy  for its generality  as well as for the magnitude  of individual 
price changes.  Not all components  moved in perfect  parallel.  As figure  2 
shows, the prices of agricultural  raw materials peaked well before the 
prices  of nonferrous  metals;  and the prices  of the main foodstuffs  declined 
months after the metals. 
The period under consideration  contained several developments  that 
may help to explain  the strength  of the commodity-price  boom. The overall 
rate of inflation  in the United States,  already  high in the recession-ridden 
early  seventies,  accelerated  in 1972  and 1973.  Similar  acceleration  occurred 
in most other countries,  stimulated  in part by large U.S. balance-of-pay- 
ments deficits  in 1971 and 1972  that flooded the world with international 
reserves in the form of dollars. These U.S. deficits generated  monetary 
expansion  directly  in those countries  that, by choice or necessity,  did not 
sterilize  the monetary  impact of the inflows,  and removed  the balance-of- 
2. The Economist  commodity price indexes for 1860-1975 used in this section appear 
in Economist,  vol. 248 (July 7, 1973), pp. 70-71; vol. 250 (March 2, 1974), pp. 86, 87; 
and vol. 256 (September  6, 1975), pp. 80-81. ON  00 
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Figure  2. Major  Components  of the Economist  Index  of 
Commodity  Prices, Quarterly,  1970-75 
Index  (1970  100) 
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Sources:  The  index  for prices  of food, metals,  and  fibers  appears  in Economist,  vol. 248 (July  7, 1973),  pp. 
70-71, and vol. 256 (September  6, 1975),  p. 81; and the price  indexes  for hides  and rubber  are  from United 
Nations, Statistical  Office,  unpublished  tabulation  (October  29, 1975). 
a. The index for agricultural  raw materials  was constructed  from the Ecoromist  index for fibers  and 
from the hides  and rubber  components  of the United  Nations  index  of commodity  prices. 
payments  constraint  usually  present  for many other  countries,  thereby  per- 
mitting  domestic  monetary  expansion. 
This period also saw the movement  to flexible  exchange  rates, briefly  in 
1971,  then more generally  after a second devaluation  of the dollar in Feb- 
ruary 1973.  The abandonment  of fixed rates of exchange  was followed by 
wide swings in several  important  exchange  rates. For example, while the 
dollar depreciated  against the German  mark by 36 percent  between Jan- 
uary 1973 and June 1975, this general  trend  was punctuated  by an appre- 
ciation of the dollar against  the mark by 11 percent  in the last quarter  of 
1973. Average  daily changes  in the dollar-mark  rate exceeded  0.8 percent 
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this period  raises  the possibility  that much of the demand  for commodities 
in 1973  was designed  to hedge against  currency  uncertainties.  We address 
this issue below. 
Analyzing the general movement of commodity prices requires  some 
summary  indexes.  We have chosen  the commodity  price  indexes  published 
by The  Economist.  As noted above, they have the advantage  of maintain- 
ing a rough  comparability  over  a long period  of time.  They  are  composed  of 
sensitive-that is, flexible-prices, so they exclude  the various  administered 
prices  such as those for oil or aluminum.  And they adopt a global, rather 
than merely  an American,  perspective:  they take prices  from the most im- 
portant market, wherever  it may be. The Economist  indexes include an 
overall  measure  covering  twenty-eight  commodities,  a food index, and an 
index of industrial  materials  covering  eighteen  commodities  that in turn is 
broken  down into indexes for metals, fibers,  and miscellaneous  industrial 
materials  (mainly  rubber  and hides).3  These indexes are highly correlated 
with the corresponding  components of the more comprehensive  United 
Nations index of commodity  prices,4  and with the prices  of thirteen  sensi- 
tive raw  materials  in the U.S. wholesale  spot market,  compiled  by the U.S. 
Department  of Labor. It is less well correlated  with the "industrial  mate- 
rials"  component  of the U.S. wholesale  price index because  the latter in- 
cludes  many items that are not raw materials  and some products  that are 
subject  to administered  pricing;  these factors  deprive  the index of consid- 
erable  sensitivity  that the Economist  measures  have to changes  in business 
or other factors.5 
3. The leading commodities of the industrial-materials  index (with percentage  weights 
in the most recent version) are as follows: copper (34.5 percent), wool (15.1 percent), 
cotton (14.5 percent), rubber (7.1 percent), zinc (6.6 percent), tin (5.4 percent), lead 
(4.2 percent), and hides (3.8 percent). Economist  (September  6, 1975), p.80. 
4.  For a comparison  between the price indexes compiled by the United Nations and 
by The Economist,  see J. B. Dearman, "World Commodity Prices," Economic Trends, 
no. 247 (May 1974) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office), pp. vi-x. 
5. The correlation matrix between indexes of commodity prices (quarterly  observa- 
tions) for 1954-74 appears at the end of this note. 
The matrix is calculated  from the all-items  commodity index and the industrial-mate- 
rials index in Economist  (July 7, 1973), p. 70, and (September  6, 1975), p. 81; the index 
of commodities on the wholesale spot market in Survey of Current  Business, various 
issues; the primary-commodities  index, 1954-69, in United Nations,  Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Price Movements  of Basic Commodities  in International 
Trade:  1950-1970, Statistical Papers, series M, no. 29, rev. 1/add. 1 (U.N.,  1971), p. 7, 
and 1970-74, in United Nations, Statistical Office,  unpublished  tabulation (October 29, 
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The presence  of general  inflation  complicates  the interpretation  of price 
movements  for any subset of goods and services.  Absolute movements  in 
commodity  prices  are  pertinent  for their  impact  on prices  of finished  goods 
through  cost and on inflationary  expectations.  On the other  hand, relative 
price  movements  are pertinent  to resource  allocation,  serving  as signals  to 
producers  and consumers.  While this paper deals with both aspects, the 
bulk of the analysis  focuses on relative  prices,  since we are concerned  with 
only a small sector of the total economy and rely on a standard  formula- 
tion that explains  relative  price  movements.  We therefore  deflate  our com- 
modity-price  series  by the United Nations price  index for exports  of manu- 
factured  goods. This index can be interpreted  crudely  as an indicator  of 
changes in the long-run nominal supply price (at constant real cost) of 
commodities,  especially  capital-intensive  mineral  commodities,  on the as- 
sumption  that the secular  change  in productivity  for materials  is similar  to 
that for manufacturing.  In other words, we use it as a general  index of 
inflation  applicable  to internationally  traded  goods. 
Figure  3 illustrates  the relative  price  movements  from 1950  to 1975  in the 
three  major  components  of the Economist  commodity  index. 
Our indexes  measure  prices  in terms of dollars,  a point of consequence 
only during  the recent period of frequent  changes in exchange  rates. We 
will comment  later on the biases that may arise from using dollars  rather 
than some other currency.  But focusing  the analysis  on a relative  price in- 
dex has the advantage  of avoiding the problem  of exchange  rates in mea- 
surement,  since  both numerator  and denominator  are in dollars  and move- 
ments in the dollar  exchange  rate cancel out in the ratio of primary  prices 
to prices  of manufactured  goods. 
U.S. 
wholesale 
United  spot 
Nations,  Economist,  market 
Economist,  primary  industrial  (13 raw 
Index  all items  commodities  materials  materials) 
Economist,  all items  1.00 
United  Nations, 
primary  commodities  0.96  1.00 
Economist,  industrial 
materials  0.95  0.87  1.00 
U.S. wholesale spot 
market (13 raw 
materials)  0.97  0.96  0.96  1.00 
(Values greater  than 0.219 are significant  at the 95 percent  level.) 4;3 
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Commodity  Prices and Demand  and Supply 
The leading explanation  for the sharp  rise and subsequent  fall in com- 
modity prices is that the world economy experienced  an unprecedented 
boom in 1972-73, followed by the recession-the worst since the 1930s- 
of 1974-75.  Figure  4 shows  the relationship  of commodity  prices  to OECD 
industrial  production  over the period 1954-74.  While individual  countries 
on occasion  have had economic  expansions  more rapid  than that in 1972- 
73, that  period  is unusual  in the past three  decades  in that economic  expan- 
sion was closely in phase in the three  major industrial  areas  of the United 
States,  Western  Europe,  and Japan.  The conjunction  of expansions  in the 
three areas, it was said, put exceptional  pressure  on raw-materials  prices. 
For the "base  line" needed  to test this proposition,  we turned  to a simple 
demand-determined  model of raw-materials  prices  to be estimated  over  the 
period 1950-74. 
One simple  model suggests  that the relative  price of a given commodity 
or group of commodities,  relative  to its long-term  trend, is a function of 
the ex ante excess demand  for that commodity,  (p -  p)/p  =  h(D*  -S*) 
where  p is the price of the commodity relative to some general  level of 
prices,  p is the trend relative  price of the commodity, D* is the ex ante 
demand  for the commodity  at price  p, and S* is the ex ante supply of the 
commodity  at price  p. To concentrate  on the cyclical  aspects  of price  move- 
ments, this relationship  can be rewritten  with demand and supply also 
taken as deviations  from their respective  trends, and normalized  around 
the trends  so that scale  alone does not influence  the percentage  deviation  of 
price from its trend: 
(1)  PP  h[(D  )  (S*-S)] 
Since  the price  variable  is taken as a deviation  from its trend,  the trend 
values  of demand  and supply,  D and N,  respectively,  can be assumed  equal, 
assured  by the required  movement  in trend  prices.  This permits  concentra- 
tion on the cyclical aspects of the problem. Moreover, since we want to 
focus first  on the demand  hypothesis,  we will suppose  not only that D =  3 
but also that actual  supply  is equal  to trend  supply,  an assumption  that will 
be relaxed  later. 
A specific  variant  of equation 1 is: 
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where  P and D designate  the deviation  from trend  of relative  prices  and of 
ex ante demand,  respectively.  Equation  2 says that the deviation  of price 
from its trend values depends  linearly  on the extent of ex ante excess de- 
mand; on that variable  squared  (and adjusted  for sign, so a negative  devia- 
tion enters  negatively)  to capture  a possible  nonlinearity  in the relationship; 
and on the percentage  change  in demand  from  the preceding  period,  to cap- 
ture any acceleration  effect-that  is, to allow for the possibility  that an 
exceptionally  rapid  change  in demand  leads  to a larger  deviation  from  trend 
price than a slow change  in demand  does. 
Any ex ante excess demand  must be eliminated  either  by an unplanned 
supply  response,  such  as the running  down of stocks,  or by changes  in price 
to assure  equality  between  ex post supply  and demand.  The formulation  in 
equation 2 assumes  that all the adjustment  is made in price-that  actual 
prices  move so as to eliminate  any ex ante excess demand.  We address  the 
question of stocks below, but for the most part they are neglected  in the 
formal  analysis. 
Equation  2, along with a variant  that allows explicitly  for supply  effects, 
provides  the main basis for our price analysis.  We also try an alternative 
formulation  that explains  percentage  changes  in prices  rather  than devia- 
tions of the price level from its trend. Variables  similar  to those in equa- 
tion 2 can be invoked  in this alternative  formulation. 
We have  no direct  measure  of ex ante demand.  However,  in the short  run 
the demand  for raw materials  may be assumed  to respond  mainly to the 
growth  in output of finished  goods that use the materials,  and more par- 
ticularly to industrial  production (a variable that includes construction 
materials).  We therefore  use industrial  production  as our proxy measure 
for ex ante demand  for raw materials.  There  has been a long-term  decline 
in the ratio of materials  inputs into manufacturing  output, but that phe- 
nomenon is taken care of by defining  the demand  variable  relative  to its 
trend.6 
The influence  of materials  prices on total industrial  production  is likely 
to be small and protracted,  so this possible feedback  effect  is neglected  in 
our analysis.  The change  in materials  prices  is presumed  to alter  the short- 
6. The elasticities at the mean of OECD consumption of the principal nonferrous 
metals with respect to  OECD industrial production over the period 1955-74 are as 
follows: primary  aluminum, 1.6; copper, 0.72; zinc (slab), 0.84; tin. 0.37; lead (refined), 
0.64. See Metallgesellschaft  Aktiengesellschaft,  Metal Statistics, 1961-1971 (Frankfurt: 
MAG,  1972), and ibid., 1952-1961 (1962); American Metal Market, Metal Statistics, 
1975 (Fairchild, 1975), and relevant preceding  issues. 682  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
run input-output  relationship  enough to eliminate  excess or deficient  de- 
mand for materials. 
DEMAND  FACTORS 
The standard  formulation  of demand for raw materials  in the United 
States  focuses  on U.S. industrial  production.  We add industrial  production 
in Western  Europe and Japan  (which will be called "other  OECD" here) 
as a separate  explanatory  variable  in order  to get a better  measure  of world 
demand  and to test the independent  contribution  of production  in the rest 
of the world  to raw-materials  prices.  Other  OECD effectively  represents  the 
net impact  of the rest of the world  since the Soviet Union is relatively  self- 
sufficient  in materials,7  and other omitted countries account for only a 
minor portion of world industrial  production.  Separating  the two compo- 
nents of "world"  industrial  production  may be  justified  on the grounds  that 
the composition of output and the techniques  of production  differ  some- 
what between  the United States and other industrial  countries,  so that a 
given change in industrial  production  could call for differing  amounts of 
raw materials. 
In fact, U.S. industrial  production  dominates  cyclical  movements  in the 
series for total OECD or world industrial  production.  This is because  the 
United States, which has a large weight in the production  totals,8  has ex- 
perienced  much  larger  variations  in production  than  has Europe  as a whole 
or Japan.9  Thus, the simple correlation  over the period 1950-74 between 
deviations  of U.S. industrial  production  (quarterly)  from its trend  and de- 
viations  in "total"  industrial  production  (U.S. plus other  OECD as defined 
here)  from  its trend  was  0.90, indicating  a strong  parallelism  between  move- 
7. The eastern trading area (USSR, China, Hungary, Poland, North Korea, North 
Vietnam, Albania, Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  German Democratic Republic, Romania, 
Mongolia) has been a modest net exporter  of nonferrous  metals to the rest of the world, 
accounting for 1 to 2 percent  of the value of world trade in these markets.  See General 
Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade, International  Trade,  1974/75 (Geneva: GATT, 1975), 
appendix table E. 
8. The weights in the OECD industrial  production index are as follows: 
United  States  Japan  Europe 
1960  52.9  5.3  38.3 
1970  42.9  11.6  40.4 
Source: OECD,  Industrial Production, Third Quarter  1965, Supplement to  Main 
Economic Indicators,  p. 8, and Industrial  Production,  1974-1, Quarterly  Supplement  to 
Main Economic  Indicators,  p. 8. 
9. The standard deviation of  deviations of  production from trend is 5.38 for the 
United States and 2.96 for Europe and Japan combined. Richard  N. Cooper  and Robert  Z. Lawrence  683 
Figure  5. Annual  Percentage  Changes  in Industrial  Production, 
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ments in the total and in its U.S. component.  In contrast,  the correlation 
between  the United States  and Europe  was -0.13  and between  the United 
States  and Japan  was 0.11. Industrial  production  in those two areas  tended 
to lag behind  that in the United States  by two to three quarters,  although 
even with allowance  for these lags, the correlations  remain  small. 
As figure  5 shows, industrial  production  in the two major  areas  was out 
of phase  in the earlier  years,  thus helping  to relieve  the pressure  on markets 
for raw materials  during  both upswings  and downswings  of business  activ- 
ity, although,  as noted, the compensation  was far from complete  because 
U.S. swings tended to be much larger.  In the later years, however, there 
was much greater  convergence  in business  activity; the simple correlation 
in deviations  from trend between  the United States and Europe was 0.68 
during  1970-74 so that the offsetting  effects  on raw-materials  demand  was 
largely  lost. 
But, even with this greater  synchronization,  the question  remains:  how 
did the cyclical  expansion  of 1972-73 compare  with that of the preceding 
two decades? Table  1. Annual  Growth  Rate of Industrial  Production  and Deviation 
from  Trend,  by Major  Industrial  Area, 1950-74 
Percent 
Growth  from preceding  year  Deviation  from trenid 
OECD  OECD 
European  Euiropean 
OECD  counitries,  countries, 
European  Japan,  Japan, 
countries  anid  and 
United  and  United  United 
Year  States  Japana  Statesa  World  States  World 
1950  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.1  -2.6 
1951  8.5  10.2  9.1  11.1  3.7  1.5 
1952  3.9  2.0  3.1  6.7  1.5  1.6 
1953  8.3  4.9  6.9  6.3  3.0  1.2 
1954  -5.3  9.5  0.5  2.9  -1.8  -2.2 
1955  12.7  -1.4  6.6  11.4  -0.6  2.2 
1956  4.4  17.5  9.6  7.7  3.4  3.2 
1957  1.3  6.3  3.4  4.8  1.5  1.4 
1958  -6.5  1.6  -2.9  0  -6.5  -4.8 
1959  11.9  6.3  9.3  11.4  -3.0  -0.6 
1960  2.2  10.7  5.9  6.1  -2.6  -1.0 
1961  0.8  6.2  4.1  5.8  -3.7  -1.8 
1962  8.2  4.5  6.4  7.3  -2.7  -1.2 
1963  6.0  5.7  5.8  6.8  -2.3  -1.0 
1964  6.8  8.1  7.4  7.9  -0.4  0.2 
1965  9.2  4.5  6.9  7.4  1.1  0.9 
1966  9.8  5.4  7.8  8.2  3.4  2.4 
1967  2.1  3.6  2.8  3.8  0.9  -0.3 
1968  5.7  9.1  7.2  8.5  2.7  1.5 
1969  4.7  11.2  7.8  7.9  5.0  2.7 
1970  -3.7  7.6  1.7  4.2  1.4  -0.4 
1971  0.2  2.5  1.3  4.0  -2.5  -2.1 
1972  7.9  5.9  6.9  7.7  -1.1  -1.1 
1973  9.0  10.7  9.9  8.9  3.1  1.1 
1974  -1.0  -0.2  -0.4  4.1  -2.6  -1.3 
Trend growth 
rateb  ...  ...  5.2  6.4 
Sources: This table is calculated on the basis of data on industrial production from the following sources: 
United States-Business  Conditions Digest (March  1975), p.  108, and  (November  1975), p.  76;  OECD 
European countries-1950-52,  OECD,  Industrial Statistics,  1900-1962  (Paris:  OECD,  1964),  p.  4,  and 
1953-74, Business Conditions Digest (January 1974), p. 108, and (August  1975), p. 104; Japan-ibid.  (July 
1974), p.  106, and (August  1975), p.  104.  World-United  Nations,  Department of  Economic and  Social 
Affairs, Statistical Office, Statistical  Yearbook,  various issues. United Nations  world industrial production 
index includes centrally planned and market economies. 
The weights referred to in note a are from OECD, Inidustrial  Production, Third Quarter 1965, Supplement 
to Main Economic Indicators, p. 8; Industrial  Production, 1968-1,  Quarterly Supplement to Main Economic 
Indicators, p. 8 and ibid., 1974-1,  p. 8. 
a.  Each area is weighted by its current share in OECD industrial production. The group in the second 
column is referred to in the text as "other OECD." 
b.  Exponential growth rates fitted over the period 1950-74. Richard  N. Cooper  and Robert  Z. Lawrence  685 
If the annual percentage  increase  in industrial  production  is used as a 
criterion,  1973  indeed saw a large boom (see table 1). The 9.9 percent  in- 
crease in the OECD index was the largest  since at least 1950 and the 8.9 
percent  increase  in world  industrial  production  was the largest  since 1959. 
On the other  hand, industrial  production  in the OECD area was only 3.1 
percent  above  its 1950-74  trend,  and the United Nations measure  of indus- 
trial  production  was only 1.1  percent  above  its 1950-74  trend.  These  are  not 
large deviations  by recent historical  standards.  Thus, if the expansion of 
1972-73  is to be singled  out, it would have to be on the basis of the speed 
with which it developed,  rather  than on the level of production  actually 
achieved.  An alternative  inference  is that the importance  of synchroniza- 
tion, while valid, has been exaggerated. 
EMPIRICAL  ESTIMATES 
Equation 2 and its percentage-change  variant were fitted for quarterly 
data over the period 1950-74. In order  to enter the influence  of industrial 
production  in the United States  and other OECD separately,  the term for 
total production  relative  to trend  in equation  2 was disaggregated  into pro- 
duction  in each of these two areas  relative  to the trend  in their total. The 
sum of these two variables  thus equals total production  relative  to trend, 
but the coefficient  for production  from  each area  is estimated  separately  by 
the regressions.  Table 2 shows the results of regressions  for nonferrous 
metals with most of the insignificant  variables  deleted.  The nonlinear  and 
percentage-change  terms  in equation  2 proved  in all trials  to be statistically 
insignificant. 
The adjustment  for the trend of inflation,  entered  either as a separate 
explanatory  variable,  as in equation  2.3, or as a deflator  to the dependent 
variable,  as in 2.1 and 2.2, is important  for explaining  prices  of raw mate- 
rials. Correcting  for autocorrelation  of the residuals  in equation  2.2 raises 
the A2 from  0.52 to 0.81 and almost  halves  the coefficients  of the two indus- 
trial-production  variables.'0 
10. Strong first-order  autocorrelation  in the residuals of an equation fitted to quarterly 
data is not surprising.  It does not cause bias in the estimated coefficients, but it does 
lead to underestimation  of the variance  of the estimators, so standard  tests of statistical 
significance  can be misleadingly reassuring  when it is present. Despite this weakness, 
and despite the improvement  of fit that correction for autocorrelation  generally brings, 
we use uncorrected  equations below because of the substantially  greater requirements 
for information  for forecasting  more than one period ahead with a corrected  equation. 
For a discussion of autocorrelation  in the residuals,  see J. Johnston, Econometric  Meth- 
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The coefficients  on the independent  variables  are not statistically  differ- 
ent from  each other.  Industrial  structure  is sufficiently  similar  in the United 
States  and in Europe  and Japan  so that total production  is the important 
influence  on prices.  When  total production  is on trend,  prices  of nonferrous 
metals  will  also be on trend  regardless  of the situations  in the United States, 
Europe,  and Japan  taken  separately.  An equation  (not reported)  using  only 
deviations  in U.S. industrial  production  from its own trend  performed  as 
well as equation  2.1. This indicates  that the greater  fluctuations  in the U.S. 
economy have been the principal  source of fluctuations  in prices of non- 
ferrous  metals over the period of regression. 
Equation  2.3 relates  the simple  percentage  changes  in prices  of metals  to 
percentage  changes in industrial  production  and prices of manufactured 
goods. The unitary  elasticity  of prices  of manufactures  supports  the use of 
relative prices as the dependent  variable in the other equations shown. 
The prices of raw materials  incorporate  the inflation  rate of other goods, 
and in addition vary according to the demand generated  by industrial 
production. 
The general message of these equations, including those run but not 
reported,  is that deviations  of prices from trend are most strongly influ- 
enced by deviations  of industrial  production  from trend, and percentage 
changes  in commodity  prices are most strongly influenced  by percentage 
changes  in industrial  production  (and not by deviations  from  trend),  imply- 
ing that a rapid  increase  in industrial  production  even from  the bottom of a 
recession  will tend to increase  metals prices sharply  from their recession 
lows. 
Table 3 shows comparable  results  for agricultural  raw  materials.  In con- 
trast  to the metals  case, in equation  3.2, changes  in industrial  production  in 
the other OECD area exert a statistically  more significant  and a quantita- 
tively larger  influence  on the prices of agricultural  raw materials  than do 
changes in U.S. industrial  production.  This result corresponds  to differ- 
ences  in the industrial  structures  of the two areas.  In 1963,  for example,  the 
United States accounted for 41.2 percent of total OECD production of 
textiles, clothing and leather, whereas Japan and Europe together ac- 
counted  for 56.3 percent.11 
11. By 1970, the United States accounted for 35.8 percent  of OECD textiles, clothing, 
and leather products; Europe and Japan produced 59.7 percent of  those products. 
These data are based on international  standard  industrial  classification  32 from OECD, 
Industrial  Production,  1955-1971 (Paris: OECD, 1973), p. 270, and OECD, Industrial 
Production,  Quarterly  Supplement  to Maint Economic  Indicators,  1975-3, p. 23. 0 
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It might  be thought  that changes  in prices  for raw  materials  would  reflect 
orders  for them, which would precede  industrial  production  by at least a 
quarter.  But various attempts to introduce leading or lagging variables 
generally  yielded  results  no better  than those from  regressions  based  on the 
same period for all variables. 
SUPPLY  FACTORS 
So far  the analysis  has neglected  the supply  side  entirely.  Yet many of the 
contemporary  explanations  for the sharp  rise in prices  in 1973-74  empha- 
sized  supply  problems.  Food was one clear  case:  poor harvests  in the USSR 
and in southern  Asia in 1972, combined with a change in USSR policy 
regarding  the maintenance  of cattle stocks in the face of bad harvests, 
resulted  in a world shortage  of grains.  Another  important  development  in 
supply was the sharp  reduction  in the Peruvian  anchovy  catch. The Peru- 
vian harvest of fish dropped 62 percent between 1970 and 1972 (and a 
further  50 percent  in 1973);12  this loss of protein-rich  animal  feed put up- 
ward  pressure  on the market  for soybean  meal and other animal  feeds, in 
the face of rapidly growing  demand for red meat throughout  the world. 
These developments  in turn may also have affected  the markets  in three 
nonfood agricultural  products-cotton,  wool, and hides-because  of the 
substitution  possibilities  or the complementarities  between  these items and 
foodstuffs.  Large  numbers  of acres were shifted from cotton to grains in 
Turkey  and Mexico, for instance,  after the sharp  increase  in grain prices 
in 1972-73, contributing  to the shortage  of cotton. Australian  sheep were 
slaughtered  in response  to the steady rise in demand  for meat and wheat 
(and weak demand for wool), with effects on the subsequent  supply of 
wool. Supplies of metals were affected  by the strikes  and political unrest 
in Chile,  the major  exporter  of copper;  and Zambia  halted  its copper  ship- 
ments  through  Rhodesia.  In addition,  some have blamed  environmentalist 
pressures  and the recession  of 1970-71 in the United States  for the failure 
of investment  in refining  capacity  to match the trend  in demand  and thus 
for the shortages  of a few years later. 
The supply of raw materials  is difficult  to measure  satisfactorily.  First, 
we consider  the deviation  of global output of nonferrous  metals  from  their 
12. The decline was from 12.6 million metric tons in 1970 to 2.3 million metric tons 
in 1973. See Food and Agriculture  Organization of the United Nations,  Yearbook  of 
Fishery  Statistics: Catches  and Landings,  1973, vol. 36 (Rome: FAO, 1974), p. 9. 690  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
trend, on the assumption  that the trend is adequate  to satisfy the trend 
growth  in demand.  Introduction  of realized  rather  than ex ante supply  into 
the equations  raises a methodological  problem, since actual supply may 
respond  to, as well as affect,  the price. This problem  did not arise in con- 
sidering  demand,  because  the level of industrial  production  for all practical 
purposes  could  be assumed  to be beyond  the influence  of commodity  prices. 
Similarly,  many changes in supply are due to "exogenous"  nonprice  fac- 
tors. But, other things being equal, one would expect prices that were 
higher  than trend  to call forth  correspondingly  higher  output of raw mate- 
rials, and this possibility  will bias the estimated  coefficients  algebraically 
upward.  We assume,  however,  that shifts  in the supply  schedule  have dom- 
inated  movements  along it. Despite this complication,  therefore,  we have 
introduced  a percentage  deviation  from  trend  output of raw materials  into 
the equations, with the results shown in table 4. The supply variable is 
statistically  significant  with a negative sign (without the bias mentioned 
above  the coefficient  would  be larger).  But its contribution  to the coefficient 
of determination  is limited, explaining  in the case of equation 4.1 only 
about 3 percent  of the unexplained  variance  in equation  2.1. Introduction 
of a nonlinear  (squared)  supply  variable  did not yield significant  results. 
The level of producers'  stocks  is also an important  variable  on the supply 
side. Other  things equal, when stocks are low, prices  might be expected  to 
rise  more than when stocks are high because  consumers  will be less certain 
of future  supply at going prices and will tend to buy more. At the global 
level, the only material  for which data were available  to test this proposi- 
tion was copper.'3  When the level of stocks at the end of the previous 
quarter  (measured  as the percentage  deviation  from trend)  is entered,  it is 
significant  and the equation  is improved  (compare  equations  4.3 and 4.1). 
Data on refinery  capacity  for nonferrous  metals can be calculated  annu- 
ally on a global basis since 1956,  and data on smelting  capacity  in copper 
are available  since 1965.  Introduction  of this variable  did not, in general, 
produce  significant  results.  Equation  4.5 is an exception:  the capacity  vari- 
able is significant,  although  smaller  than the supply variable. 
Our attempts  to introduce  a supply variable  for agricultural  raw mate- 
rials  did not meet with much success.  For one thing, only annual  data are 
available.  The supply variable  was significant  for wool, but an aggregate 
supply  index for fibers  alone, or for all nonfood agricultural  commodities, 
13. This series includes stocks held by refiners and at the New York Commodity 
Exchange  and the London Metal Exchange (LME). xir  g  g  !  ;,)  O  ~~~n  i  fn  ?  0SR 
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proved  to be statistically  insignificant  or, when significant,  to have a posi- 
tive coefficient.  Within a calendar  year, supplies of cotton and of rubber 
respond  to price incentives,  thereby  confounding  any effect of supply on 
prices  within  the period of observation.  In addition,  government  interven- 
tion, especially  the U.S. cotton-support  program,  interfered  strongly  with 
the relationship  between  output and availability  until the early 1970s. 
Explanation  of the Boom 
To summarize  the results  thus far, conventional  business-cycle  analysis, 
adapted  to the circumstances  of industrial  raw materials,  can go much of 
the way toward  explaining  movements  of industrial  prices. How well can 
such equations  explain  the extraordinary  increases  in commodity  prices  of 
1972-74?  For this purpose  ex post regressions  over  the whole  sample  period 
are a little like Monday-morning  quarterbacking.  But how well could the 
price changes  of 1972-74 have been anticipated  on the basis of structural 
information  available  in 1971, given what happened  to demand  and sup- 
ply? Answering  this question  requires  an out-of-sample  projection  based 
on regressions  fitted over a period  earlier  than that of special interest,  but 
making  use of the realized  values  of the independent,  or "exogenous,"  vari- 
ables.  We have reestimated  equation  4.1 over the period 1954-70,  and used 
the resulting  equation to "forecast"  changes in nonferrous  metals price 
over the period 1971-74. We start  with 1954  in order  to be able to "back- 
cast" the Korean  War  period  as well. The estimating  equation  is shown as 
4.6 in table  4. We chose the equation  that did not use stocks on the grounds 
that information  on future  stocks would not be available  for a forecast. 
The actual  values of relative  prices  of nonferrous  metals  (RPM) and the 
fitted values for 1971-74 are shown in figure  6. The mean absolute error 
over the out-of-sample  period is 17.2 compared  with 12.0 over the period 
that was estimated.  The residuals  fall into an interesting  pattern:  they are 
strongly  negative  in the second half of 1972  and the first  quarter  of 1973- 
the most vigorous  phase of the boom in the United States-and  they are 
strongly  positive  (that is, actual  prices  were  well above the fitted  prices)  in 
the first two quarters  of 1974,  reflecting  the continued  rise of prices for a 
period  after industrial  production  had reached  its peak. 
Most attention  has been focused on the very high prices that were sus- 
tained into 1974, but the unexpectedly  low prices in late 1972, given the Richard  N. Cooper  and Robert  Z. Lawrence  693 
Figure 6.  Actual and Fitted Deviations from Trend of Relative Prices of 
Metals,  Quarterly, 1971-74 
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strength  of the boom, are equally  puzzling.  A possible  explanation,  derived 
from perusal  of the trade  journals of that period, is the widespread  belief 
at the time in substantial  excess productive  capacity in nonferrous  met- 
als.'4 This industry had been built up substantially  in response to the 
strong demand  of the late 1960s, and when that was followed  first by the 
recession  of 1970-71 and then by the winding  down of the Vietnam  War, 
capacity  appeared  adequate  for any expected  demand for years to come. 
This attitude  was reflected  in investment  activities  in mining,  smelting,  and 
refining;  already  modest plans for expansion  were actually  trimmed  back 
14. In the periodic Department of Commerce survey on plant and equipment,  con- 
ducted as of June 30, 1972, only 25 percent of primary-metals  manufacturers  believed 
more plant and equipment were needed, 56 percent that existing capacity was ade- 
quate, and 19 percent that it exceeded needs. By March 1974, the figures were 51, 48, 
and 1, respectively.  Survey of Current  Business,  vol. 54 (June 1974), p. 19. 694  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1975 
Table  5. Growth  of Global  Capacity  in Selected  Nonferrous  Metals, 
Selected Periods, 1955_73a 
Annual rate of increase,  in percent 
Copper 
Period  Smelting  Refining  Lead  Zinc 
1955-65  3.0  4.1  n.a.  n.a. 
1965-70  2.2  5.9  4.1  5.0 
1970-73  -1.0  3.4  1.5  0.5 
Sources:  Year Book of the American Bureau of Metal Statistics, 1973 (1974), and issues for  1970, 1965, 
1955. 
a.  Calculated from  data on  annual capacity at  year end.  Communist countries are omitted  owing  to 
absence of accurate data. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
in 1971. The Federal Reserve Board series on U.S. capacity in primary 
metals  shows a shortfall  from  trend  of 4 percent  by the beginning  of 1974; 
and investment  in productive  capacity  in the nonferrous  metals  industry  in 
the noncommunist  world slowed down substantially  in 1970-73. Indeed, 
in copper smelting,  there was an absolute decline (see table 5). Environ- 
mental concerns and new requirements  to reduce pollution also delayed 
bringing  some planned  investment  to fruition on their original  schedules. 
The general  view that capacity was more than ample in 1972 may have 
contributed  to the delay in price increases  in response  to rising economic 
activity,  as consumers  drew  down their  inventories  in confident  expectation 
that they could replenish  them comfortably  later. Furthermore,  in spite of 
mounting demand, global refinery  stocks of copper were high and rising 
throughout  1972.  Metals  prices  began  to rise  rapidly  in early 1973,  but they 
remained  below trend for several  months. Refinery  stocks of copper fell 
precipitously  in 1973.15 
I  The sharp  increase  in prices  in late 1973  has drawn  the most attention. 
Because  it came  from  a point well  below  trend.  it was all the more  dramatic. 
Underlying economic conditions (as embodied in our estimating equa- 
tions), particularly  the rise in industrial  production  throughout  the world, 
would have explained  an increase  in relative prices to  18 percent above 
trend. Given the sharp increase in prices of manufactured  goods (mea- 
sured  in dollars)  during  this period,  plus an upward  trend  in prices  of non- 
ferrous  metals of about 5 percent  a year in nominal  terms,'6  a dollar-price 
15. American Metal Market, Metal Statistics, 1975, p. 65. 
16. Prices of nonferrous metals followed an upward trend of 4.8 percent during the 
period 1950-74, while prices of agricultural  raw materials  had a slight downward trend. 
The price of nonferrous metals relative to manufactured  goods had an annual upward Richard  N. Cooper  and Robert  Z. Lawrence  695 
increase in nonferrous  metals of nearly 70 percent might have been ex- 
pected from the third quarter  of 1972 to the third quarter  of 1973, com- 
pared with an actual  price increase  of 79 percent.  But prices  continued  to 
rise rapidly  thereafter,  even in the face of sluggish  industrial  production, 
and by the second  quarter  of 1974  reached  a peak nearly  42 percent  above 
the trend of relative  prices. 
CHANGES  IN  COMPOSITION  OF OUTPUT 
We have not tested formally for the impact on nonferrous  metals of 
changes in the composition of output. These metals are used especially 
heavily in construction,  and in production  of machinery  and transporta- 
tion equipment.  In late 1973 and early 1974, construction  and automobile 
production  were already declining,  but machinery  production  continued 
strong  well into 1974,  in Europe  and Japan  as well as in the United States. 
The U.S.  industrial  production index with its various components re- 
weighted  by their use of nonferrous  metals  (including  aluminum),  like the 
industrial  production  index, reached  a peak in the fourth quarter  of 1973 
and turned  down thereafter.  Thus, while the reweighted  index experienced 
larger swings than the official index-it  dropped 3 percent between the 
second and third quarters  of 1974  alone-its  peak and subsequent  decline 
still occur too early  to suggest  that changes  in the composition  of demand 
can explain the continued  rise of prices of nonferrous  metals into 1974.17 
Moreover, production of machinery  and transportation  equipment  gen- 
erally  swings  more than total industrial  production,  so that some procycli- 
trend of  2.7 percent during the period 1950-74 and of  2.9 percent over the period 
1950-70. 
17. The  following table compares the  official. U.S.  industrial production index, 
taken from various issues of the Survey of Current  Business,  with the index reweighted 
according to the use its components make of nonferrous metals. The reweighting is 
based on the 1967 input-output tables reported in the Survey of Current  Business,  vol. 
54 (February 1974), table 1. 
1973  1974 
Reweighted  Original  Reweighted  Original 
Quarter  index  index  index  index 
1  100.0  100.0  102.0  101.5 
2  102.4  101.4  103.1  101.9 
3  104.3  102.9  99.9  101.9 
4  105.7  103.2  96.9  98.5 696  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
cal change  in the composition  of demand  for nonferrous  metals  is built  into 
our estimating  equations.  This question  deserves  further  analysis,  however, 
both for U.S. experience  and for Europe and Japan. 
FLUCTUATIONS  IN  EXCHANGE  RATES 
As noted above, the fluctuating  value of the dollar after March 1973 
should  not have a consequential  effect  on our unit of measurement,  which 
is in prices of raw materials  relative  to prices of manufactures,  both mea- 
sured  in dollars.  If, however,  any depreciation  of the dollar  were reflected 
fully and immediately  in the prices  of raw  materials-that is, if their  prices 
were determined  wholly outside the U.S. market  (an implausible  assump- 
tion, in view of the influence  of U.S. industrial  production  on materials 
prices)-and if, in contrast,  export prices of manufactured  goods from all 
major countries  were fixed in terms of dollars in the short run, then our 
main price  variables,  RPM and RPA, would reflect  fully any change  in the 
value of the dollar relative to other currencies.  The U.S. dollar was de- 
valued 10 percent"8  in February 1973, and then depreciated  against the 
major European  currencies  from March,  when currencies  were allowed  to 
float in the marketplace,  until  July.  When  weighted  against  other  currencies 
by shares  in world  trade,  this depreciation  amounted  to a further  9 percent. 
Thus, on extreme  assumptions,  the depreciation  of the dollar in the first 
half of 1973  could have explained  a rise  in prices  of nonferrous  metals  rela- 
tive to manufactures  of about 18 percent. From July 1973 until January 
1974,  however,  the value of the dollar  returned  almost to its pre-February 
1973  value; if the implausible  assumption  on pricing  also holds for appre- 
ciations, that movement  should have accounted  for a decline  in materials 
prices relative to manufactured  goods. Prices of fibers continued  to rise 
beyond July, reaching  their peak in September  1973, and then declined 
about 1 percent  by January  1974; prices  of metals, however,  continued  to 
rise steadily  until  April 1974  and only thereafter  declined.  By that time, the 
dollar was again depreciating-about 10 percent between January and 
May, when it began to appreciate  again (see table 6). 
The evidence suggests that materials  prices are strongly influenced  by 
what happens  in the U.S. market,  so that they are unlikely  fully to reflect 
any change  in the value of the dollar relative to other currencies.  Move- 
18. In terms of the official price of gold or special drawing rights. The effective de- 
valuation against other currencies  was lower because several other currencies-for  ex- 
ample, the Canadian dollar and the British pound-depreciated  against SDRs as well. Richard N.  Cooper and Robert Z. Lawrence  697 
Table 6. Values  of U.S. Dollar in Terms  of Other  Currencies, 
Compared  with  Prices of Raw Materials,  January  1973-August  1975 
Percentage  deviation from average value in March 1973B 
Valuie  of dollar  Price of materials 
(sign reversed) 
Relative to  Relative to 
Date and point in  ten other  special  Nonferrous 
appreciation-depreciation  currenciesb drawing  rights"  metals  Fibers 
cycle  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1973 
January  3d  9.7  6.1  22  25 
March  0.0  0.0  0  0 
July 6 (low)  -8.8  -5.9  -31  5 
1974 
January  28 (high)  8.5  5.1  -41  -3 
May 10 (low)  -2.0  -1.5  -96  12 
September  3 (high)  3.5  2.2  -19  27 
1975 
March 3 (low)  -9.4  -4.2  -10  33 
August 12 (high)  3.1  1.9  -  2  33 
Sources: Columns 1 and 2, unpublished data provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System; columns 3 and 4, calculated from monthly  averages in Economist (September 6, 1975), p. 81. 
a.  In March 1973, fixed exchange rates were abandoned by a number of  European countries and their 
currencies were allowed to float vis-A-vis the U.S.  dollar and otlher currencies. 
b.  Eight European currencies plus the Canadian dollar and Japanese yen,  weighted by  1972 share in 
global exports plus imports. 
c.  A weighted average of sixteen currencies; nearly one-third of the weight is accounted for by the U.S. 
dollar. 
d.  Within 0.5 percent of Smithsonian "central rates" of December 1971. 
ments  in the value of the dollar  measured  in SDRs (the dollar  accounts  for 
about one-third  of the weight of the "basket"  of sixteen currencies  that 
determines  the value of the SDR) are less dramatic  than those measured  in 
other currencies,  and probably give a more accurate-though still exag- 
gerated-picture of the impact of fluctuations  in exchange  rates on mate- 
rials  prices. 
In our judgment, the importance  of movements in exchange rates on 
prices of commodities  lies not so much in changes  in the unit of measure- 
ment as in the psychological  effect of fluctuating  exchange  rates on spec- 
ulative demand. 
The Korean  War Experience 
The outbreak  of hostilities  in Korea in June 1950  came when the world 
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tions of shortages  led to heavy purchases  by consumers  and businessmen, 
and set off a worldwide  boom of considerable  proportions.  By the time the 
hoarding  reached  its height at the end of March 1951 and before prices 
began  to fall, the Economist  index  was 55.7 percent  above its level when  the 
Korean  War  began.  Total industrial  production  had risen  at an annual  rate 
of 15 percent  and was 5.54 percent  above trend  (compared  with the 1973 
peak 3.38 percent  above trend).  Although food prices rose by 26 percent 
over this period, the boom was centered  in industrial  raw materials.  The 
Economist  fibers  index rose by 88 percent  and the metals  index by 45 per- 
cent. These changes stand in sharp contrast with those of the 1972-74 
boom, in which  food prices  had the largest  increase  among  the components 
(table 7). 
After a respite  in mid-1951,  the expansion  resumed  until the middle of 
1953.1'  During this second phase of the expansion, however, prices of 
primary  commodities  fell steadily,  and by June 1953,  the Economist  index 
had returned  to its June 1950  level. 
When equation  4.6 is backcast  over the period 1950-53,  it puts the peak 
for relative  prices of nonferrous  metals in the first quarter  of 1951, at 36 
percent  above trend.  In fact, metals prices  did peak in that quarter,  but at 
49.7 percent  above trend. Because  the equation  also underestimates  these 
prices  in the two quarters  prior to the invasion in June 1950, only part of 
the underestimation  can be attributed  to wartime  commodity  speculation. 
The equation  then overestimates  metals prices in the boom year of 1953, 
when evidently  the large inventory  accumulation  of the early  fifties, com- 
bined with the resolution  of the Korean conflict,  served  to depress  prices 
below what they otherwise  would have been.20 
In retrospect,  it seems fortunate  that the world  was near  the trough  of a 
cyclical  recession  when the Korean  War broke out. The speculative  boom 
that the war set off provided  the cushion  of inventories  and the stimulus  to 
the expansion of primary-goods  capacity that facilitated  the remarkable 
noninflationary  expansion of 1952-53, generated  by the war-induced  in- 
19. For a fuller discussion of the Korean War business cycle in the United States, 
see Bert G. Hickman, Growth  and Stability of the Postwar Economy  (Brookings Institu- 
tion, 1960), chap. 5. 
20. The mean absolute error over the period 1950-53 is 18 percent  as compared with 
the within-sample  mean absolute error  of 12 percent.  For a discussion of the behavior of 
commodity prices during this period, see Gertrud Lovasy, "Prices of  Raw  Materials 
in  the  1953-54 U.S.  Recession," International  Monetary Fund Staff Papers, vol.  5 
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Table 7.  Troughs and Peaks, and Changes, Price Indexes of Selected 
Commodities, 1949-53  and 1971-75  Cycles 
Monthly averages 
Date and index  Change 
(1963  100  for 1949-53;  (percent) 
1970 =  100 for 1971-75) 
Trough  Peak to 
Commodity  Troughl  Peak  Trougha  to peakb  trough, 
and cycle  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
ALL ITEMS 
1949-53 cycle 
Date  6/49  3/51  6/53 
Index  65.1  155.7  98.6  82.1  -44.9 
1971-75 cycle 
Date  11/71  5/74  6/75 
Index  87.3  253.8  201.0  97.6  -23.2 
FIBERS 
1949-53 cycle 
Date  7/49  3/51  2/53 
Index  85.9  232.6  98.8  92.1  -80.7 
1971-75 cycle 
Date  3/71  1/74  1/75 
Index  94.7  310.3  195.6  106.5  -45.3 
FOOD 
1949-53 cycle 
Date  6/49  6/51  6/53 
Index  58.0  113.7  92.7  64.9  -20.3 
1971-75 cycle 
Date  11/71  11/74  7/75 
Index  88.9  329.4  235.7  115.0  -33.2 
METALS 
1949-53 cycle 
Date  6/49  2/51  9/53 
Index  56.2  134.7  90.2  82.3  -39.6 
1971-75 cycle 
Date  11/71  4/74  6/75 
Index  75.3  230.6  111.1  101.5  -69.9 
a.  For the 1971-75 cycle, the figure in this column is the lowest  observation over the period January 
1974-August  1975. 
b. The calculation is made with  the appropriate data  in columns  1, 2,  and  3,  as  follows:  (col.  2  - 
col. l)/Rcol.  I +  col. 2)/2]. 
c.  Calculated as (col. 3 -  col. 2)/[(col.  2 +  col. 3)/21. 
Sources: Econzomist  (July 7, 1973), pp. 70-71, and relevant succeeding issues. 700  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
crease  in military  expenditure.2'  It was equally fortunate  that this expan- 
sion was accompanied  by good crops and falling  food prices.  In contrast, 
the speculation  in 1973-74,  aggravated  in part by the Yom Kippur  War in 
October  1973,  occurred  when recession  was close at hand. The resulting 
buildup  in industrial  inventories  exacerbated  the recession,  and a poor crop 
year in 1974  combined  with depleted  international  grain  reserves  to make 
food prices a major problem  in the stemming  of inflation. 
Speculation 
During 1973-74  much  talk centered  on commodity  speculation.  Was the 
large  jump in prices above the predicted  level the result of a scramble  for 
commodities  for speculative  purposes?  Were  large amounts  purchased  for 
holding rather  than for further  fabrication?  This is a simple question  that 
should have a straightforward  answer. 
NONFERROUS  METALS 
Unfortunately,  the data on stocks of commodities  other  than  those in the 
hands of producers  are generally  unavailable.  Industrial  production  in the 
OECD countries  was over 9 percent  higher  in 1973  than in 1972,  and world 
demand  for nonferrous  metals  probably  grew  in rough  proportion,  or per- 
haps slightly faster, given the heavy production  of automobiles  in 1973. 
World smelter production of lead and zinc and of refined copper rose 
about 3 percent  and about 5 percent,  respectively,  and world  production  of 
tin fell modestly,22  for a price-weighted  average  increase  of about 41/2  per- 
cent. So the growth  in supply  did not satisfy  the growth  in demand  during 
that year. But the implied  price  elasticity  of demand  for nonferrous  metals 
-that  is, the percentage  discrepancy  in imputed  demand  over new supply, 
divided  by the observed  increase  in prices-should have been less than  0.06 
to explain fully the price increases  that were observed  by late 1973 and 
early 1974. This figure  contrasts  with estimated  short-run  price elasticities 
21. From 1951 to 1953, the U.S. economy averaged  a 2.7 percent  unemployment  rate 
combined with a 4.1 percent decline in the wholesale price index and a 3.0 percent in- 
crease in the consumer price index. For a fuller exploration of the reasons for  price 
stability,  see John P. Lewis, "The Lull That Came to Stay,"  Journal  of Political Economy, 
vol. 63 (February 1955), pp. 1-19. 
22.  Mining Annual  Review, 1974 (London: Mining Journal, 1975), and ibid.,.)1973. Richard  N. Cooper  and Robert  Z. Lawrence  701 
of demand  of -0.21  percent  for copper in the United States, -0.09  per- 
cent for copper  in Europe,  and -0.55  percent  for U.S. tin.23  Allowance  for 
stockpile sales of lead, tin, and zinc by the United States-equivalent to 
around  5 percent  of world  production-would reduce  the implied  elasticity 
even further.  We infer,  therefore,  considerable  speculative  demand  for the 
metals  in late 1973  and especially  in 1974.  For example,  the Japanese  were 
exceptionally  heavy buyers of nonferrous  metals in 1973; their imports 
increased  by 40 percent,  much more than did their industrial  production 
(17 percent).  (These  purchases  were  perhaps  stimulated  in part by the soy- 
bean embargo  imposed by the United States in June, which might have 
been feared  as a precedent.) 
The rapid  growth  in consumption  was satisfied  by drawing  down stocks 
of metal at refineries  throughout  the world, as well as by substantial  sales 
of lead, tin, and zinc from  the U.S. strategic  stockpile  (a topic to which  we 
return,  below). Except  for zinc, net imports  into the United States  declined 
in 1973,  so in effect  U.S. stockpile  sales reduced  U.S. reliance  on the world 
market  and eased supplies  elsewhere. 
How much of the reduction  in recorded  stocks  went  into consumer  hold- 
ings is difficult  to know. Japanese  firms became large sellers of metals, 
especially copper, in late 1974, indicating  substantial  excess inventories 
there. 
AGRICULTURAL  RAW  MATERIALS 
Prices  peaked  earlier  for agricultural  raw  materials  than for metals, gen- 
erally  in late 1973.  But these products,  too, were subject  to a combination 
of cyclically  high demand,  speculative  pressures,  and some supply  deficien- 
cies. While the pressures  on agricultural  raw materials  were quite general, 
four commodities-wool, cotton, rubber,  and hides-account for the bulk 
23. The calculation here is based on  the  Economist index for nonferrous metals, 
in which copper has about two-thirds  of the weight. The examples of estimated elastic- 
ities used here are from Franklin M.  Fisher and Paul Cootner, in association with 
Martin N. Baily, "An Econometric  Model of the World Copper Industry,"  Bell Journal 
of Economics  and Management  Science, vol. 3 (Autumn 1972), pp. 568-609, and F. E. 
Banks, "An Econometric Model of the World Tin Economy: A Comment," Econo- 
metrica, vol. 40 (July 1972), pp. 749-52. 
The fact that U.S. producers  sold below the free-market  price would, however, tend 
to raise that price disproportionately  in times of heavy demand, so the elasticity cal- 
culation must be applied with caution. The United States accounts for about one-fifth 
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of this category  that moves in international  trade (and for 82 percent of 
the weight  in the Economist  index). Vegetable  oils are somewhat  less im- 
portant,  because  their use is mainly in edibles. 
These four products  have diverse  backgrounds.  Use of wool for fabrics 
is on a strong downtrend,  while world demand for cotton is rising. As a 
result,  wool prices  were  deeply  depressed  in 1970-71,  and herders  cut back 
their  flocks, responding  in part to the strong demand  for meat and wheat 
and setting  the stage for an apparent  wool shortage  in 1972-73. 
Cotton has been strongly  influenced  by U.S. agricultural  policies, since 
this country  accounts  for about one-fifth  of world exports.  For years, the 
Commodity  Credit  Corporation  stabilized  the price.  As with grains,  policy 
shifted away from direct support, and government  stocks, which in the 
mid-sixties  had amounted  to over one-quarter  of world production,  were 
virtually  exhausted  by mid-1971.  World production  grew sharply  in 1972 
and substantially  in 1973,  but world demand-especially from developing 
countries-also rose substantially.24 
Production  of hides, a by-product  of the slaughter  of beef for meat, fell 
modestly  below its 1970 levels in 1971 and 1972 as beef herds were being 
built up. In addition, Argentina, the second largest cattlehide  exporter, 
drastically  lowered its export quotas on cattlehides  in 1971 (to protect a 
domestic  leather  industry),  so that its exports  fell from  7.5 million hides in 
1970 to 3.4 million in 1971. 
FUTURES  TRADING 
A further  indicator  of the "speculative"  behavior  in 1973  and 1974  was 
the tremendous  expansion of trading  in futures in a wide range of com- 
modities.  Futures  transactions  between  the early 1970s  and the first  half of 
1974  went up over 50 percent  in lead and tin, doubled  in zinc and copper, 
and rose nearly  threefold  in rubber  (see table 8). It is possible  neither  em- 
pirically  nor conceptually  to differentiate  between pure speculation and 
hedging  by users, but demand  for long forward  positions in commodities 
grew substantially,  accompanied  by sharp increases in both prices and 
volume. Anxiety about supplies  in the face of continuing  strong demand 
24. World consumption of  cotton  increased 1.6 million bales for the year ending 
June 1973, compared with annual increases ranging from 400,000 to 1.2 million bales 
during the preceding four years. U.S. Actions Needed to Cope with Commodity  Short- 
ages, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller  General of the United States (1974), 
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Table  8. Annual  Volume  of Turnover  on Commodity  Futures  Markets  in 
London  and  New York, Selected  Commodities,  1970-74 
Thousands of long tons; except cotton, millions of bales 
Market- 
Commodity  place  1970-72  1973  1974a 
Copper  Londonb  2,303  4,222  3,068 
New Yorke  2,470  6,301  6,887 
Cottond  New York  25  45  40 
Lead  London  801  1,341  1,251 
Rubber  London  148  599  590 
Tin  London  154  169  248 
Zinc  London  612  1,325  1,276 
Sources: W.  C. Labys, Speculation and Price Instability on Internatio,,al Commodity Futures Markets, 
United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade and  Development,  TD/B/C.1/171  (UN,  1974),  p.  4;  tabulation 
provided by New  York Cotton Exchange. 
a.  January-June, annually adjusted. 
b. London Metal Exchange, wirebars only. 
c.  Commodity Exchange, Inc., only. 
d. No, 2 contract traded on New York Cotton Exchange. 
for finished  goods, combined  with general  uncertainty  concerning  interna- 
tional monetary  developments,  may have been sufficient  to stimulate  hedg- 
ing purchases  by users of raw materials. But when such purchases  run 
way ahead of normal  demand,  their  motive is hardly  distinguishable  from 
that for speculation-the expectation  of reselling  (in this case, in fabricated 
form) at a profit. 
CAUSES  OF SPECULATION 
A number  of reasons  can be invoked for the commodity  speculation  in 
1973 and 1974. 
Shortages.  At the level of general  public discourse,  considerable  atten- 
tion had been given to The Limits of Growth,  which strongly  underlined 
(among  other  things)  the finiteness  of the earth's  resources  and drew  public 
attention to their possible exhaustion within a foreseeable  future. This 
psychology of shortage  was reinforced  when production  of several  com- 
modities actually fell despite rising demand and rising prices; a notable 
example  was the world fish catch. In the face of a vigorous boom, many 
manufacturers  may have feared  for their supplies  of raw materials  and en- 
gaged in anticipatory  buying. The oil embargo  of October 1973 no doubt 
lent credence  to these fears, while at the same time threatening  a business 
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Inflationary  expectations.  Speculative  behavior  might have been intensi- 
fied by the rapid  rise in inflationary  expectations  in 1973 and especially  in 
early 1974, following the quadrupling  of oil prices posted by the Orga- 
nization of Petroleum  Exporting  Countries.  Led by food, U.S. consumer 
prices  rose by 6 percent  during 1973, twice the rise of the preceding  year, 
and by year end prices were rising even more rapidly.  Most other coun- 
tries saw even greater  increases  in consumer  prices.  The acceleration  in in- 
flation  may have  created  an environment  in which  businessmen  felt  justified 
in purchasing  above-normal  amounts  of raw materials,  in the expectation 
that even the historically  high prices that they were paying could be re- 
couped through  higher  prices of finished  goods.25 
Exchange-rate uncertainty. The  period  1973-74  was  also  fraught with 
considerable  uncertainty  regarding  exchange  rates. The postwar interna- 
tional monetary  system  broke down in the spring  of 1973 when countries 
abandoned  their  commitment  to fixed  exchange  rates  and major  currencies 
were allowed to float against one another in the exchange  markets.  The 
U.S. dollar  promptly  fell against  other  leading  currencies  by nearly  10 per- 
cent, from March until July 1973, and this movement,  taken with the de- 
valuations  of December  1971  and February  1973,  left most observers  with 
the strong  impression  that the dollar  was undervalued.  But few were  willing 
to bet heavily on it, so the dollar remained  depressed;  in fact, to some it 
appeared  likely to slide for some time, until the Yom Kippur  War and the 
oil embargo  exposed  Europe's  basic  economic  vulnerability  and resulted  in 
an appreciation  of the dollar. A good deal of currency  speculation,  both 
spot and forward,  took place during this period-as  shown by foreign- 
exchange  losses later reported  by some of the world's major banks. It is 
quite  likely  that uncertainty  regarding  currency  values  also stimulated  com- 
modity speculation-especially where exchange controls limited transac- 
tions between  currencies.  Indeed, for a country  such as Japan,  going long 
on internationally  traded  commodities  needed  for future  production  was a 
way to reduce  large dollar holdings of uncertain  value. 
Flexible  exchange  rates  introduced  a new and unfamiliar  uncertainty  into 
short-run  calculations  of cost and profitability,  and risk-averse  businesses 
25. In contrast to 1950-51, there is little evidence of hoarding by households during 
the recent period; on the contrary, personal saving rates in the United States jumped 
from 6.6 percent of personal disposable income in 1972 to 8.2 percent in 1973 and to 
8.9 percent in the first quarter of 1974, despite (or because of?) substantial increases 
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may have preferred  the more familiar  uncertainty  of buying  raw materials 
needed  for future  production,  thereby  assuring  themselves  of supplies  at a 
known  cost, or of buying  futures.  A sharp  increase  in hedging  demand  for 
futures,  by driving  futures  prices  up, may then have stimulated  commodity 
speculation  on both spot and futures  markets,  thereby  driving  prices up 
still further. 
One indication of deepened  financial  uncertainty  is the change in the 
price of gold, a commodity  that displays a secular  increase  in industrial 
demand  but whose  price  in the short  run is typically  dominated  by specula- 
tive purchases  (including  changes  in "hoarding"  demand  by the traditional 
repositories  of nonmonetary  gold, Asia and the Middle  East).  After mone- 
tary authorities  ceased to intervene  in the London gold market  in March 
1968,  the price gradually  rose from $35 an ounce to between $60 and $70 
an ounce. With the second  devaluation  of the dollar  in February  1973  and 
the general  move to flexible  exchange  rates,  the price of gold rose sharply, 
reaching  a peak of nearly $130 in July 1973 (during  this period the dollar 
was also depreciating  against  continental  European  currencies,  though  not 
so rapidly).  The price then receded to below $100 by November, when 
announcement  of the Arab oil embargo  and the subsequent  quadrupling 
of oil prices sent the price up dramatically  to about $180 in early April 
1974. The price then moved erratically  throughout  the rest of the year, 
reaching  a peak of nearly $200 in January  1975 (associated  with interna- 
tional  disagreement  on the future  shape  of the monetary  system,  and on the 
role of gold in it). During 1975  the price  retreated,  to under  $140, with the 
announcement  that the International  Monetary  Fund would sell off one- 
sixth  of its substantial  gold holdings  for the benefit  of less developed  coun- 
tries. 
The sharp  increases  in gold prices  in the spring  of 1973  and again in the 
spring  of 1974 can be taken as a rough indicator  of the prevailing  uncer- 
tainty about the functioning  of the international  economic system in the 
face of substantial  changes  such as the adoption of floating  exchange  rates 
or a marked  increase  in oil prices. (It is also true, however, that South 
Africa,  the major producer  of new gold, reduced  its sales substantially  in 
1974,  pushing  the price  up; and there  were  periodic  rumors  that European 
nations  would resume  official  purchases  of gold at a high price.)  Prices of 
art objects,  antiques,  real estate, wine, and other  hedges  against  an uncer- 
tain value of money also rose sharply  during  this period. Thus, the con- 
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declines  in industrial  demand,  may reflect  this same  uncertainty  with  regard 
to the financial  system. 
Price  controls.  Finally,  but not least, some speculation  within  the United 
States may have been stimulated  by the price controls on commodities 
during  the second  half of 1973. Commodities  had been subject  to the price 
freeze of August 1971, then decontrolled  between  November 1971, when 
Phase II started,  and June 1973. In that month, producer  prices of non- 
ferrous  metals, among others, were subjected  to a ceiling by Presidential 
order.  Price  ceilings  initially  also applied  to domestic  sales of scrap  metal, 
and world demand at that time was so high that scrap was immediately 
diverted  into the uncontrolled  export markets  (leading  to appeals for ex- 
port controls on metal scrap, such as had been imposed on soybeans in 
June).  Copper  scrap  prices  were  decontrolled  in August,  with a consequent 
rise in domestic  scrap  prices  and decline  in exports;  but the refined  metals 
were  not decontrolled  until December,  whereupon  producer  prices  rose. 
The impact of U.S. price controls on the relatively  free prices of the 
metals  that are included  in the Economist  index is complex.  In a period of 
high demand,  price  controls  on one important  segment  of the market,  U.S. 
smelters  and refiners,  should  lead to higher  prices  in uncontrolled  sectors, 
to which purchasers  shift for their marginal  supplies. So a sharp rise in 
London prices in the summer  and fall of 1973 might have been expected, 
although  it should  have been associated  with some increase  in net imports 
into the United States;  in fact, net imports  of copper, lead, and tin fell in 
1973.  American  fabricators  were  evidently  competing  with  surging  demand 
elsewhere  in the world. 
But once American  prices  were  decontrolled  (or, as in the case of copper, 
the ceiling was raised), the opposite effect should have been observed:  a 
decline  in the London  prices,  ceteris  paribus.  Zinc  prices  did indeed  decline 
briefly,  but lead and copper showed no such response,  and zinc soon re- 
sumed  its upward  movement  into 1974.  So the impact  of U.S. price  controls 
on London  prices,  if any, must  have come in early  1974  through  speculative 
demand  stimulated  by the prospect  of a resumption  of price controls, and 
hence restricted  supplies,  at some later time. 
Whatever  the origins of commodity speculation  in 1973-74, they were 
quite different  from those in 1950-51. During the earlier  period, most of 
the speculation  was motivated  by concern  about physical  shortages  to ci- 
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of foods and of finished  goods-was  done by households,  presumably  for 
future  use. 
The Desirability  of Limiting  Price Movements 
The sharp  increase  in commodity  prices  in 1973  was  cause  for widespread 
anxiety  and even alarm.  It was for many a new and unusual  development 
that seemed  to support  a number  of fears  that were  current  concerning  the 
exhaustion  of resources  and the acceleration  of inflation.  The movement  of 
economic  variables  such  as prices  into new  and unexpected  values  generates 
uncertainty  and induces  both protective  and speculative  actions, often in- 
distinguishable  from one another.  Were  the sharp  increases  in prices  going 
to continue  into even  more  implausible  values?  Were  they going  to level off 
at the new  highs?  Or  could  they  be expected  to recede  to the more "normal" 
levels within  the realm  of earlier  experience?  When  demand  is exceptionally 
high, a rapid increase  in prices acts as a useful rationing  device, inducing 
some buyers  to drop out of the competition.  On the other  hand,  rapid  price 
increases  can also act as a destabilizing  signal,  inviting  purchases  with the 
objective of riding the price up to its crest and then selling, whether  in 
unfabricated  or in fabricated  form (for users  of the material  can be specu- 
lators as well). In the end the boom burst and those who bought near the 
peak lost money-a  salutary,  chastening  experience  for those who specu- 
lated; but forestalling  even a temporary  boom may have been socially 
preferable. 
The direct  impact  of raw-materials  prices  on the consumer  price  index  is 
relatively  low if fuels are excluded,  but it is not negligible.  On direct  pass- 
through,  it takes an increase  of 141/2  percent  in the prices  of nonfood, non- 
fuel raw materials  to increase  the consumer  price index by 1 percent.26  On 
this basis, a doubling  of these commodity  prices  would increase  consumer 
prices  by 7 percent.  Moreover,  a scare  psychology  of any kind  may be con- 
tagious,  and strong  increases  in raw-materials  prices  that led to speculative 
purchases  could spread  into markets  for more  highly  fabricated  goods, with 
broad  effect.  This phenomenon  did not seem to arise  during 1973-74  (as it 
had in the first wave of the Korean boom of 1950),  although  apparently 
there was some contagion from one commodity market to another, for 
26. Joel Popkin, "Commodity Prices and the U.S.  Price Level," BPEA, 1:1974, 
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the underlying  supply-demand  situation cannot explain even moderate 
price increases  for some commodities. 
While  the direct  impact of materials  prices on the consumer  price  index 
is relatively  small,  there  is potential  indirect  impact. Sharp  increases  in the 
prices  of materials  offer  manufacturers  justification  both to themselves  and 
to the public to raise their prices-very  much as increases  in the cost of 
living  provide  moral  justification  to most people  for increases  in wages;  and 
manufacturers  may take the occasion  of such price  increases  also to widen 
their margins,  when demand  for their goods is strong, and thus produce  a 
multiple  effect  rather  than simply  a pass-through  of materials  prices.  Con- 
vention or fear of public opprobrium  may not inhibit  price increases  that 
seem "cost  justified,"  even when demand  for finished  goods is weak.  Firms 
following a long-run  pricing  strategy  and worried  about their own unwill- 
ingness  (for whatever  reason)  to change  prices  freely  may well find it expe- 
dient to widen markups  when demand  is stagnant  whenever  higher costs 
of materials  or labor can at least superficially  help them justify their ac- 
tions. Under these circumstances,  extraordinary  increases in materials 
prices  provide  a dense  enough  cloud of informational  noise to permit  price 
increases  well beyond  the direct  impact on costs.27  Increases  in commodity 
prices would then in effect  play the role of price leader  in an oligopolistic 
industry,  signaling  all participants  to raise their prices. The effect would 
not be fully symmetrical,  since  such  industries  would  not be fully  exploiting 
their collective  market  power. Even though specific  illustrations  abound, 
this point must remain  conjectural:  since commodity  prices  and markups 
both tend to rise and fall with business  activity,  the independent  influence 
of commodity  prices  is difficult  to sort out. 
A further  cost of large  increases  in materials  prices  hinges on the policy 
targets of the government,  and in particular  of central banks. Under a 
regime  in which  changes  in the price  level are a target  of policy, in the sense 
that price increases  evoke both concern and restrictive  action, and in an 
economy in which prices of manufactures  and services  fall only sluggishly 
in response  even to strong excess supply, increases  in materials  prices, of 
whatever  origin,  will depress  production  in the higher-stage  processing  sec- 
27. A similar phenomenon is frequently  observed in less developed countries follow- 
ing a  currency devaluation. Devaluation jars public expectations enough and stirs 
enough general confusion to  permit economically unrelated price increases to  pro- 
ceed without public disapproval. See Richard N.  Cooper, Currency Devaluation in 
Developing  Countries,  Essays in International  Finance 86 (Princeton University, Inter- 
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tors. Supply shortages  due to bad harvests  will in the short run raise not 
only the relative  prices of the goods in short supply but also the general 
price level. Restrictive  action to combat "inflation"  will then generate  a 
recession-a  paradoxical  response to  a shortage of supply.28  Large in- 
creases  in commodity  prices thus may result in real costs to the economy 
operating  via the policy response  to them.  Moreover,  since  price  reductions 
are  likely  to be especially  welcome  to the monetary  authorities  in a modern 
economy  with secular  inflation,  the policy response  is not likely to be fully 
symmetrical:  price declines  in themselves  are less likely to generate  expan- 
sionary measures than price increases are to  generate contractionary 
measures. 
By creating  uncertainty,  price  fluctuations  for a given product  may also 
hold investment  below what it otherwise  would have been in that product. 
Finally,  large  price  fluctuations  in final  products  probably  stir consumer 
anxiety,  itself undesirable  if it can be avoided at low cost. 
The Possibilities  for Limiting  Price Movements 
If large  price increases,  even when only temporary,  impose costs on the 
economy, what are the possibilities  for limiting them? As usual, one ap- 
proach deals directly with prices, the other indirectly by manipulating 
quantities. 
PRICE  CONTROLS 
Presenting  problems  in the best of circumstances,  price  controls  are par- 
ticularly  difficult  for raw  materials.  The reason  is partly  that raw  materials 
are more frequently  traded  in highly competitive  markets  than are many 
products,  and partly  that raw  materials  enter  more freely  into international 
trade than do many other products.  The first condition  makes price con- 
trols much more difficult  to establish  and to enforce  than they are in less 
competitive  sectors  of the economy;  and  the second  makes  them  impossible 
to enforce  without  restrictions  on exports  and (for a commodity  that is im- 
ported)  subsidies  to imports  if the country  wishes  to maintain  domestic  use 
of those commodities. 
28. For a discussion of this problem in the context of a simple two-sector model, 
see Robert J. Gordon, "Alternative  Responses of Policy to External Supply Shocks," 
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During  the Korean War, imported  commodities  and most domestically 
produced  agricultural  commodities  were exempt from the price controls, 
which  were  introduced  in January  1951.  In any case, the controls  were  im- 
posed when commodity  prices, though not the prices of many fabricated 
products, had reached their peak. Thus, the "control" system on most 
covered commodities  (for example, scrap and refined  metals) consisted 
largely of deciding how rapidly to lower the price ceilings on products 
whose market  prices  were falling  almost continuously  during  the two-year 
duration of the controls. If the controls had any effect at all on com- 
modity  prices,  it was probably  to increase  them during  the several  months 
before  January  1951  during  which  controls  were  anticipated;  effective  con- 
trols on fabricated  products  during  1951  may, however,  have damped  pro- 
ducer demand  for high-priced  raw materials  and thus contributed  to the 
decline in prices during 1951.29 
As noted earlier,  the price  ceilings  imposed  on a number  of commodities 
in June 1973 quickly encountered  problems. Exports of soybeans were 
embargoed,  with heavily adverse  reaction abroad  (not surprising  in view 
of the long-time  efforts of the U.S. government  and farm community  to 
encourage  dependence  on the United States as a supplier  of agricultural 
products).  Prices  abroad  continued  to rise, and drew  supplies  of a number 
of products  from  the U.S. market.  The price  ceilings  on copper  scrap  had to 
be abandoned  in August,  for instance,  in order  to permit  effective  domestic 
competition  with foreign  purchasers  of U.S. scrap. 
It is not impossible  to maintain  a system  of price  controls  in the presence 
of relatively  free foreign  trade, only very difficult.  Indeed, the nonferrous 
metals industry itself maintains a reasonably effective system of  "con- 
trols" in that the prices charged  by U.S. producers  of copper, lead, zinc, 
and a number  of less important  metals  often differ-sometimes by substan- 
tial amounts-from those  prevailing  on the London  Metal  Exchange.  Why, 
during  periods like late 1973 and early 1974, do U.S. producers  maintain 
prices far below those prevailing  in the international  markets,  and con- 
tinue  to supply  their  customers  at the lower  prices  rather  than divert  output 
into higher-priced  foreign sales?30  And why, in a period like 1975, when 
29. For a detailed account and assessment of price controls during the Korean War, 
see Gardner Ackley, "Selected Problems of Price Control Strategy, 1950-52" (August 
1953; processed) (available on microfilm from the National Archives of the United 
States). 
30. Price ceilings on U.S. producers  might seem to offer the explanation during the 
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LME prices  were below U.S. prices, do buyers  continue  to deal with U.S. 
refiners  rather  than  import  from  abroad?  These  are  intriguing  questions  for 
detailed  exploration.  But the answer  lies, we think, in implicit long-term 
futures  contracts  designed  to reduce  uncertainty  both for buyers and for 
sellers,  so that both parties forgo short-run  maximizing  behavior  for the 
sake of long-run  security.3' 
Whatever  the reason, it is obviously  possible  under  some circumstances 
to maintain  a dual  market  for long periods  of time even without  formal  im- 
port or export restrictions,  without arbitrage  undermining  it. During pe- 
riods of high LME prices, the U.S. producers  must in some way ration 
sales to their  traditional  customers,  including  their foreign  customers.  This 
behavior  incidentally  makes  it possible  to impose  controls  on prices  of U.S. 
producers,  as was done from June to December 1973, and it also means 
that prices of a major part of sales of nonferrous  metals in the United 
States  move only sluggishly  in response  to sharp  changes  in market  condi- 
tions; the producers  themselves  damp down both increases  and reductions 
in price. 
BUFFER  STOCKS 
Buffer  stocks, which manipulate  quantity  rather  than price, may be a 
more effective, although less direct, way to influence  price movements. 
Actual sales from buffer  stocks can satisfy demand  that temporarily  runs 
ahead  of production,  and prospective  sales from  buffer  stocks  may be suffi- 
cient  to nip any speculative  boom in the bud, or even  to inhibit  the bud  from 
forming. 
Introducing  buffer  stocks raises  three  questions:  How large should they 
be? How much do they cost relative  to the alleged  benefits?  When should 
the manager  of the stock buy or sell?  We will not address  the last question 
here, except  to say that it is no more necessary  to operate  the buffer  stock 
on the basis of fixed  buying or selling  prices  than it is for policymakers  to 
intervene  in the Treasury  bill market or the foreign-exchange  market on 
that basis. In particular,  the rate of change  of price should generally  figure 
in decisions  of the manager  to buy or sell. 
The regression  equations we relied on for assessing  the nature of the 
31. For an interesting exploration of a related line of thought in connection with 
the costs of  inflation, see Arthur M.  Okun, "Inflation: Its Mechanics and Welfare 
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recent  price  changes  can also be used in reverse  to get a crude  estimate  of 
the stocks  that might be required  to hold price  changes  within  some speci- 
fied range,  based on "normal"  demand.  Suppose,  for example,  we want to 
keep nonferrous  metals  prices  (as measured  by the relatively  volatile  Econ- 
omist index) within a range of 30 percent  around  its trend relative  to the 
prices  of manufactured  goods-that  is, within  a 15 percent  deviation  from 
trend.  Equation  4.6 offers  a reasonable  explanation  of relative  price  move- 
ments in terms of underlying  demand and supply variables.  During the 
second and fourth quarters  of 1973  the estimated  price exceeded  its trend 
by more than 15 percent,  for a total excess  deviation  in the two quarters  of 
4 percentage  points (see figure 6). If we assume that changes in ex ante 
demand for nonferrous  metals are proportionate  to changes  in industrial 
production, then it would have required  additional sales equivalent to 
about  0.6 percent  of annual  U.S. consumption  of nonferrous  metals  to hold 
prices within 15 percent  above trend (world supply was about four times 
U.S. consumption  in 1972).  A similar,  alternative  calculation,  based on the 
estimated  coefficient  for deviations of supply from trend rather  than on 
industrial  production, suggests that sales of roughly six times that size 
would have been required  (the estimated  coefficient  on OECD industrial 
production  is about six times the coefficient  for supply). But the supply 
coefficient  has a downward  bias, so we would judge that required  sales 
might vary between 1 and 2 percent  of U.S. consumption. 
These are not enormous  amounts,  even if buffer  stocks were  designed  to 
cover  two booms of the magnitude  of 1973's.  However,  the residuals  of the 
fitted equation show that demand in late 1973 and early 1974 was not 
adequately  explained  by the movements  in industrial  production  and in the 
supply of nonferrous  metals. To make matters  worse, even sales in 1973 
from the U.S. strategic  stockpile of lead and zinc of around one-fifth  of 
U.S. consumption,  and sales of tin of around one-third  of consumption, 
did not prevent  the sharp  increase  in prices  (see table 9). The "speculative" 
demand  thus absorbed  the stockpile  sales and still drove up prices. 
The same  regression  equation  can be used to estimate  the stocks  required 
to satisfy  the total speculative  demand  for nonferrous  metals at a price  in- 
crease  no greater  than 15 percent  above trend.  The actual  prices  were  more 
than 15 percent above trend during the fourth quarter  of 1973 and the 
first  half of 1974,  for a cumulative  total of 59 percentage  points in excess  of 
15 percent  over the three  quarters  (see figure  6). The quantities  required  to 
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Table 9. U.S. Stockpile  Sales, Stocks, and Consumption, 
Selected  Strategic  Materials,  1971-74 
Thousands  of short  tons 
Activity, anzd  year and half  Copper  Lead  Rubber  Tin  Zinc 
Stockpile  sales 
1971:  First  0  3  0  1  0 
Second  0  7  40  1  2 
1972: First  0  18  28  *  78 
Second  0  32  28  *  134 
1973:  First  0  70  37  2  108 
Second  0  179  67  20  158 
1974:  First  231  143  36  25  175 
Second  20  86  1  2  92 
Stocks, December  1973 
Excess  over  strategic  needs  252  764  182  213  437 
Consumption,  1972 
United States  2,236  1,120  717p  62  1,417 
World  8,718  4,592  3,493  258  6,086 
Sources:  General Services Administration,  Office of  Preparedness, Stockpile  Report to  the  Congress, 
July-December 1974 (GSA,  1975), and relevant preceding issues; Commodity Research Bureau, Commodity 
Year Book, 1975 (1975), pp. 291, 294;  American Metal Market,  Metal Statistics, 1975 (Fairchild,  1975), 
pp. 95, 149, 251, 281. 
*  Less than 500 short tons. 
p  Preliminary. 
amounted to  about 9 percent of annual U.S.  consumption  of nonferrous 
metals  on the basis of the regression  coefficient  applicable  to OECD indus- 
trial production,  and about six times that on the basis of the regression 
coefficient  applicable  to world supply (the latter figure is biased for the 
reason given earlier)."2  To these figures  would have to be added  that por- 
tion (roughly  30 percent  in the case of lead and zinc) of the stockpile  sales 
to users of the metals-that  is, the portion that did not go through  U.S. 
producers. 
Speculation by definition involves an attempt to profit from future short- 
ages (or from future excess supply),  and if the stockpiles had been large 
enough to satisfy the speculative demand that in fact developed,  specula- 
tion would probably have been less intense than it actually was. This view 
has been expressed with respect to foodstuffs: depletion of the Commodity 
Credit Corporation's  stocks  of  grains and  other products has been  seen 
32. By the same management  rule, a buffer stock would have had to purchase  non- 
ferrous metals during 1972 and in the fourth quarter of  1974 to keep relative prices 
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as a major  factor  in the sharp  price  increases  of 1973.33  But it must reckon 
with the large stocks of certain  commodities  in December  1973.  The U.S. 
strategic stockpile held, in  excess of  so-called strategic requirements, 
amounts  of tin equivalent  to 77 percent  of world  consumption  in 1973;  for 
lead and zinc, the corresponding  figures  were 16 percent  and almost  7 per- 
cent. Yet the prices of these products  increased  sharply  with other com- 
modity prices. The reason these large stocks did not prevent  prices from 
rising  may lie, however,  in the General Services  Administration's  lack of 
authority  to sell more than a small portion of these stocks. In view of the 
major  political  effort  required  to get congressional  approval  of GSA sales 
of any product  produced  in the United States,  the "market"  perhaps  cor- 
rectly  discounted  the possibility  of large sales from the strategic  stockpile. 
New authority  did become available  in late December  1973,  but even that 
limited  sales  to only a small  portion of excess  holdings.  Thus,  the full GSA 
holdings were not available  to the market. A further  limitation on GSA 
sales was that some of its holdings had already  been committed  for sale 
under  long-term  contracts. 
Perhaps  if GSA had  had full authority  to dispose  of its total surplus  hold- 
ings of nonferrous  metals and other commodities,  the price developments 
of 1973-74 would have been very different.  But at this stage that must 
remain  a conjecture. 
The International  Tin Council  does manage  a buffer  stock in an effort  to 
keep world  prices  within  a 20 percent  range,  and the council  sold tin stead- 
ily during the first three quarters  of 1973. But its holdings were small, 
amounting  at the beginning  of 1973  to only about 5 percent  of world  con- 
sumption.  Sales  of three-quarters  of that amount  were  evidently  inadequate 
to stem the combined  real and speculative  boom of that year.34 
If properly  managed buffer stocks hold out at least the possibility of 
stabilizing  prices,  what about the costs? These can be separated  into three 
components:  the capital  costs (the forgone  earnings)  of carrying  the stocks, 
the storage.and  maintenance  costs, and the terms-of-trade  costs of acquisi- 
33. See Fred H. Sanderson, "The Great Food Fumble," Science, vol. 188 (May 9, 
1975), pp. 503-09. 
34. Of course, as the experience of the U.S. Treasury with respect to silver in the 
early sixties demonstrates,  even an enormous "buffer"  stock cannot prevent  speculative 
purchases  of a commodity if the trend of demand of the commodity for use is running 
ahead of prospective new production. Conversion of silver coins to copper and nickel 
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tion. The last may actually  be regarded  as a benefit  if the stocks are ac- 
quired during  a period of weak demand  and large downward  price devia- 
tions are also thought  to be undesirable.A5 
Carrying  costs for metals  are  negligible:  0.03 percent  of market  value for 
the major nonferrous  metals in the strategic  stockpile during  fiscal year 
1974,  for instance,  or an average  of under  25 cents a ton. On this basis, it 
would cost only about $225,000  a year  to carry  stocks of copper,  lead, tin, 
and zinc equivalent  to about 20 percent  of annual  U.S. consumption.  Stor- 
age costs for agricultural  raw materials  are higher:  GSA storage  costs for 
natural rubber amounted to  $3.96 a ton in fiscal 1974, for instance, or 
about 0.5 percent  of average  market  value during  the year.36 
The major cost in carrying  a buffer  stock is the capital cost.37  At 1971 
prices, it would have cost $660 million to acquire  stocks of copper, lead, 
tin, and zinc equivalent  to 20 percent  of U.S. consumption  of those metals 
in 1972.  Judgments  vary  on the true  opportunity  cost of government  funds, 
but in real  terms  it probably  lies between  5 and 10  percent;  if so, the annual 
costs of carrying  such buffer  stocks of these nonferrous  metals would be 
between $33 million and $66 million. 
A calculation  such as this must  be taken  with a grain  of salt. But it prob- 
ably points to the right magnitude  of the costs to be weighed  against  the 
important,  if less tangible,  benefits  that would flow from the stocks. Fur- 
thermore,  price  fluctuations  themselves  could  be greatly  reduced  if manage- 
ment of  aggregate demand could be improved to  the point at which 
coordinated  booms of the magnitude  experienced  in 1972-73,  which  set the 
stage for speculative  purchases,  and the subsequent  coordinated  slump, 
could be avoided. 
35. If the commodity is primarily  imported and the policy perspective  is a national 
rather than a global one, however, this terms-of-trade  effect must be reckoned a cost, 
although possibly a low one if the acquisitions are spread over a long period. 
36. Data on carrying costs were provided by the U.S.  General Services Adminis- 
tration. 
37. The money a buffer stock makes by buying low and selling high may help to 
finance the operation, but it does not reduce the social costs of acquiring  and carrying 
physical stocks. Those are real and must be set against any benefits that flow from 
price stabilization. Intervention in future markets need not require physical stocks, 
but substantial physical stocks would surely be necessary for preventing a sharp in- 
crease in speculative sentiment and for inhibiting the formation of supply-restricting 
cartels. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Barry  Bosworth:  In this paper, Cooper and Lawrence  have tried to trace 
the origins of the rise in prices of nonfood nonfuel commodities  in 1972- 
74. The competing hypotheses that they examine are (1) an abnormally 
rapid growth in demand for consumption  uses, (2) unusual shortfalls in 
supply,  and (3) speculative  activity.  The study  does examine  nonfood agri- 
cultural  raw materials,  but the empirical  work focuses upon nonferrous 
metals-a  category  in which copper accounts  for two-thirds  of the index 
that they use. They deflate  this metals index by the index of world prices 
for traded  manufactured  commodities.  Both the narrow  range  of the metals 
index and the choice of the deflator  may affect some of their conclusions. 
As their figure 3 shows, in the deflated  form they use, the rise of metals 
prices  in 1973-74  is not abnormal  compared  with that in 1964-66.  But this 
comparability  of the two periods  really  is a story for copper  since  prices  of 
most other basic commodities  did not rise nearly as sharply  in the earlier 
period.  Also, their relative  price  deflator  rose by 52 percent  in the 1971-74 
period compared  with 32 percent for more general indexes such as the 
OECD deflator.  Thus,  it minimizes  the rise  in relative  prices  of metals  in the 
latter period. 
When  the authors  introduce  a supply  variable  in their  equations  in table 
4, I do not believe that primary  refinery  production is the appropriate 
choice. The measured  negative  effect is likely to represent  an average  of a 
negative  and a positive association  of quantities  with price. First, changes 
in capacity,  or disruptions  due to strikes,  will be inversely  related  to price. 
But, in addition, a reduction  in price will lower production for a given 
capacity.  The negative  coefficient  tells me that in industries  with high fixed 
costs, the first  effect  dominates;  but it is an underestimate  of the influence 
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of supply disruptions  on prices because of the inadequate  distinction  be- 
tween shifts in the supply curve and movements  along it. In a short-run 
model, refinery  capacity  would be a more relevant  variable.  Finally, there 
is no room in the model for the very large sales out of government  stock- 
piles in some periods, and the view that production  trends represent  the 
equilibrium  market  condition  requires  some heroic assumptions. 
The latter  portions of the paper concentrate  upon speculation,  which I 
think  must  play a primary  role in any interpretation  of the 1973-74  period. 
It is unfortunate  that conclusions  about the role of speculation  must be 
inferred  from  the residuals  rather  than  more direct  evidence.  Moreover,  the 
authors  can only guess  about  the driving  force  behind  the speculation.  Was 
it an implication  of basic market  pressures?  Since not all markets  would 
have the same degree  of capacity  pressure,  this explanation  would suggest 
wide  variation  in relative  price  changes-which does not seem  to have been 
the case. Did the uncertainties  of the international  financial  system  spur  the 
speculation across a broad range of commodities?  Or did it reflect an 
inflation-induced  flight from money? But all of these explanations  must 
also be applicable  to the subsequent  collapse of commodity  prices. 
A correct  interpretation  of the 1973-74  period  is crucial  to the final  por- 
tion of the paper,  which  is concerned  with stabilization  schemes.  For exam- 
ple, buffer-stock  requirements  vary substantially  depending  upon whether 
the problem  is speculation,  or disruptions  in demand  or supply.  A specula- 
tive interpretation  also would, in some cases, reduce  expectations  of a re- 
currence,  since 1973-74 was an unusually  turbulent  period. Furthermore, 
the question is not one of adopting a system of buffer stocks against a 
history of no attempt  to stabilize  these markets.  Indeed, the government 
had engaged  in extensive  stockpile  activity.  While everyone  is aware  of the 
previous  existence  of U.S. food reserves,  GSA was also quite active in the 
metals markets. As table 9 indicates, in fiscal year 1974, stockpile sales 
represented  about 10 percent  of U.S. copper consumption,  30 percent  for 
lead, 75 percent  for tin, about 25 percent  for zinc, and 15 percent  for rub- 
ber. Not included  in the table  are aluminum  sales  equal  to about 15  percent 
of primary  production. 
Finally,  I would  emphasize,  more  than the authors  do, the importance  of 
raw-materials  prices for the general  price level. Although a 14  1/2  percent 
price  increase  in these  products  is required  to raise  the U.S. consumer  price 
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and agricultural  raw materials  items rose even more than that, the impact 
does not seem so small. A combination  of market  structure,  controls,  and 
GSA sales  held down increases  in producer  prices  in the United States,  but 
price  increases  in steel, aluminum,  other  metals,  fibers,  lumber,  and paper 
have been serious  cause for concern  in previous  inflations.  If one believes 
that such sudden  relative  price increases  initiate  strong  inflationary  forces 
within the domestic economy because of institutional arrangements  (a 
rachet  process),  they become even more significant. 
Hendrik  S. Houthakker:  I read  this paper  with mixed feelings.  The idea of 
investigating  the overall  behavior  of commodity  prices  is a good one and in 
some ways the authors  have added considerably  to our knowledge.  How- 
ever, two self-imposed  limitations-the  neglect of food commodities  and 
the neglect  of energy  commodities-compromise  the usefulness  of the paper 
as an analysis  of commodity  prices. 
As Barry Bosworth noted, the story here is basically a copper story. 
This is not the authors'  purpose,  but the metals index  they use happens  to 
give a very heavy weight  to copper.  Unfortunately,  as a copper  story, it is 
not a very good one, because  much more could be said about copper  than 
this paper  reflects.  Rather  than go through  the paper  in detail, I can asso- 
ciate  myself  with  most  of  the  comments  and  questions  that  Bosworth 
raised. Therefore,  let me first put forward  an alternative  hypothesis  con- 
cerning  the development  of commodity  prices  during  the great  inflation  of 
1972  to early 1975  and then comment on a few specific  points. 
My hypothesis  is that commodity  markets  are inherently  more sensitive 
to supply  and demand  changes  than are  any other  markets  in the economy. 
In fact, institutional factors such as information facilities and contract 
forms  are conducive  to price  sensitivity.  So, it is very easy for such  markets 
to register  both large and small differences  in supply and demand.  What I 
think  we are observing  in these  markets  is the intensification  of inflationary 
pressure  that began  in 1972.  I would  attribute  this increase  in general  to the 
breakdown  of the Bretton Woods system and in particular  to the large 
accumulation  of international  reserves  between 1969 and 1972. Such an 
accumulation  created  a tremendous  amount of excess purchasing  power. 
And, while in most markets,  excess demand  generally  takes a long time to 
show up in prices, it showed up quite rapidly  in the sensitive  commodity 
markets. 
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during 1972 was concentrated  on commodity  markets  as the inflationary 
pressures  raised  the demand  for inventories  of raw  materials  by users.  This 
extraordinary  rise in raw-materials  demand  is not captured  by the normal 
relation  between  raw  materials  and  the demand  for final  goods, represented 
by industrial  production,  that the authors rely on. Then, as inflationary 
pressures  were  alleviated  by general  price  increases,  there  was a correspond- 
ing negative  reaction  in commodity  prices-the  necessary  sequel to what 
went  before.  I do not think  that the Cooper-Lawrence  effort  to relate  these 
price movements  primarily  to changes in industrial  production  has been 
fruitless;  but while they can offer some insights  into the price increases  in 
this way, they certainly  cannot explain  everything. 
I would like to offer several  specific  comments  on the particular  model 
and methods  used by the authors.  First,  I do not agree  with  the use of rela- 
tive prices  and deviations  from  trends  as variables  in the regressions.  If my 
hypothesis  is correct  and commodity  prices  were  the first  to rise, deflating 
commodity  prices  by industrial  prices  creates  quite  an obscure  model. I feel 
it would have been more illuminating  if Cooper  and Lawrence  had tried  to 
explain  changes  in commodity  prices  without  deflation  and without  devia- 
tions from  trend  as well as with  these  adjustments.  Perhaps  this would  have 
provided a clearer  picture of how their approach  contributes  to the ex- 
planation  of price  increases.  Second,  Cooper  and Lawrence  consider  indus- 
trial production only in the OECD area. However, USSR and Chinese 
purchases  often have a major  impact  on these  markets;  for instance,  China 
has been a factor of some importance  in the copper  market.  I suggest  that 
imports of these countries  should be considered  in an analysis of world 
commodity  prices. 
Third,  I feel that the term  "speculation"  is used  too loosely in this paper. 
Is it speculation  if a shoe manufacturer  buys more hides than he usually 
does-or  is this anticipatory  hedging?  It is misleading  to call all the many 
different  activities  in these markets  "speculation."  Furthermore,  consider- 
ing that the major  emphasis  in the paper  is speculation,  the data used seem 
inadequate,  since they were from a secondary  source. It would have been 
useful to examine the notion that speculation  was a major factor in the 
price movements  by examining  data on open interest  by type of position 
(large  hedgers,  large  speculators,  and small  traders),  which  are available  for 
some American  markets. 
Finally, I would like to raise a question about the treatment  of buffer 
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carrying  such stocks. If the stocks are acquired  to stabilize  prices and are 
successful  in doing this, there would be a profit, so what would the social 
cost consist of? 
General Discussion 
The panel actively  discussed  the importance  Cooper  and Lawrence  gave 
to speculation as an explanation of the recent commodity-price  boom. 
Robert Solomon criticized  the authors  for attributing  to speculation  all of 
the price  movement  that their equation  could not explain,  and found their 
evidence  for this interpretation  unconvincing.  He expressed  particular  sur- 
prise at the importance  they attributed  to movements  in exchange  rates in 
explaining  commodity  speculation,  and wanted  the authors  to expand  their 
explanation of how fluctuating  exchange rates affect commodity prices. 
Furthermore,  Solomon questioned  the relationship  between the price of 
gold and of other  commodities  in 1973-74.  In response,  Cooper  stated  that 
there were two links between currency  fluctuations  and the purchase  of 
commodities.  First, he recalled,  dollars  had been considered  "as good as 
gold" and then were twice devalued  and allowed to float. Countries  that 
were long in dollars  might have found it politically  acceptable  to convert 
dollars into commodities  (or to encourage  the private sector to do so). 
Japan, for instance,  bought commodities  well in excess of her needs, and 
may actually  have been trying to unload dollars. Second, manufacturers 
might have wanted to purchase  commodities  in the face of floating ex- 
change rates because  they were risk averters.  They preferred  to purchase 
commodities  ahead of actual need in order  to get them at a known price. 
Arthur Okun agreed  with Cooper, explaining  that the introduction  of 
exchange-rate  risk  will make  currencies  as a group  less attractive.  Thus, the 
decrease  in dollar  holdings  will not be fully offset  by an increase  in holdings 
of other types of currency.  James  Tobin noted that this phenomenon  de- 
pended  on the covariance  matrix  relating  the risks  in different  assets.  Coo- 
per agreed,  but suggested  a strong  presumption  in favor of Okun's  view. 
Consider  a fabricator  who relies on world markets  for inputs and who is 
suddenly  confronted  with a movement in exchange  rates. His knowledge 
about currencies  is so much  less than his knowledge  about the commodity 
that it makes  more sense for him to go into the commodity  whose market 
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Gardner  Ackley argued  that a speculative  interpretation  of the recent 
boom was necessary,  as it was in the 1950-51 experience.  However, he 
noted an interesting  difference  between  the two booms. In the fifties, the 
boom in industrial  production  continued  for several  years after  the end of 
the commodity-price  speculation,  with the U.S. unemployment  rate de- 
clining to around 3 percent. In connection with this difference,  Ackley 
thought  that the paper  did not pay enough  attention  to the impact  of price 
controls  on the commodity-price  boom of 1950-51,  which  he felt probably 
played a major role in ending  the speculative  boom. Also on this subject 
of controls,  Fred Bergsten  questioned  the view that price  controls  were  not 
possible without export controls.  In World  War II and the first few years 
afterward,  price controls were not coupled with export controls but were 
applied  to exports as well as to domestic  sales. Bergsten  felt that this ex- 
perience  should be studied before one concluded  that price controls and 
export controls  must coincide. 
Lawrence  Krause  found it useful  to distinguish  two types of speculation; 
speculative  buying  for fear of unavailability  and speculative  buying  in an- 
ticipation  of price  rises.  The distinction  is important  because  the two differ- 
ent types can be modified  in different  ways. Buffer  stocks can reduce  the 
speculative  buying  that arises  from the questionable  availability  of a com- 
modity, while action in the forward  market can defuse speculation  over 
prices that is not grounded  in the supply-demand  balance.  Krause noted 
that it would be useful to find a way to measure  the "supply  constraint" 
speculation.  Cooper and William  Nordhaus  agreed  with Krause's  percep- 
tion of the problem,  and Cooper  went on to remark  that this distinction  is 
also one of the major  differences  between  the commodity-price  boom of the 
early fifties, which reflected  fears about availability,  and that of the early 
seventies. Frank Schiff felt that concern over availability  could be con- 
nected with fear of controls as well, and that such concern  probably  did 
play an important  role in the recent commodity-price  boom. 
The panel focused on stocks and stockpile  management  as one way of 
averting  price increases  due to speculation.  Ackley noted how important 
stocks were in determining  the current  prices of commodities.  The metals 
studied  by Cooper  and Lawrence,  he observed,  are commodities  with large 
stocks relative  to current  production  flows. As a result,  the rate of release 
and accumulation  of stocks is an important  factor  in the determination  of 
commodity  prices,  and conversely,  expectations  about price  changes  are an 
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prices.  Lawrence  Klein noted that a good deal of valuable  information  on 
stocks  could  be gathered  from  trade  associations  and  might  mieasurably  im- 
prove the equations. He also pointed out that the disposal of stocks by 
GSA is often influenced  by diplomatic  and other  considerations  that should 
be taken into account  in explaining  price-stabilization  activity. 
Nordhaus saw no reason why buffer  stocks had to be positive. He felt 
that physical  holdings  were not necessary  because  one could play the for- 
ward  market.  If a short position were desirable,  the answer  was to take a 
short position in the forward  market.  He noted that if buffer  stocks were 
operated  in such a fashion,  the capital  costs of keeping  them would  fluctu- 
ate around zero in the long run. Cooper answered  that Nordhaus was 
correct with respect to speculation  due to concern over price, but when 
speculation  rose from the fears of inadequate  supply,  physical  stocks were 
necessary. 
Robert  Solow and  Klein offered  suggestions  on the form  of the equations 
and variables  used. Solow pointed out an inconsistency  in form between 
the table 2 and table 4 equations.  The regressions  in table 2 could be con- 
sidered as a reduced  form from a demand-and-supply  analysis, with the 
U.S. and other OECD production  relative  to trend  acting as a measure  of 
demand shifts. To carry  through  this reduced  form in table 4 requires  a 
measure  of supply shifts, which the supply  (production)  of materials  does 
not provide. Cooper and Lawrence  agreed,  but noted that their attempts 
to cite explicit  measures  of capacity  were not very successful  and worked 
only in an equation that also included supply. Solow also noted that a 
model with a nonlinear  supply curve that became very inelastic at high 
levels of output would have been plausible  a priori  and would have had a 
better  chance  of explaining  the large  increases  in prices  in 1973-74.  Cooper 
replied that a squared  supply term was tried in the regressions  but was 
insignificant. 
Klein offered  several  suggestions  for improving  the variables  used by the 
authors. He agreed that raw-materials  prices should be deflated, as the 
authors  had done, but questioned  the particular  price  index  they had used. 
A more appropriate  deflator  would  have consisted  of the prices  of the capi- 
tal goods and consumer  goods that countries  that produce  raw materials 
were  buying.  Klein also argued  that pressure  on capacity  should  have been 
measured  more directly  as the appropriate  variable for explaining  prices. 
He believed  that  capacity  pressure  in raw-materials  industries  was  very  high 
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felt that capturing  this fact would have improved  the equations  and their 
predictions  of the recent  period. 
Klein also urged  the importance  of more disaggregation  and attention  to 
specific market conditions in analyzing raw-materials  markets. For in- 
stance,  on the supply side, in recent  years  the political  and social situation 
in the Congo  and Chile  were  important  in the case of copper. Similarly,  on 
the demand  side, developments  in the steel industry  are directly  relevant  to 
explaining  the situation  in iron ore. Klein reported  that good price  relations 
could be obtained  by proceeding  in that fashion  for thirty  or so commodi- 
ties. Cooper  accepted  Klein's  point, but argued  that the commodity  boom 
was a very general  phenomenon  and that much  might  have been missed  by 
concentrating  on individual  commodities. 